

A few passed through one or two wooden walls, or broke off corners of wood or masonry. Many windows were broken. It is the writer's impression that except for large glass windows, by far the most damage was blast damage. (This applies to the particular projectiles involved chiefly on December 7, 1941, but is no prediction.)

Some projectiles landing in gardens and out of doors apparently did not explode at all, but merely made a one or two-foot hole in wet ground and passed several feet downward. General advice to persons in air raids is well borne out by observations. At any point seen by the writer, a person lying in a two-foot trench or behind a two-foot embankment 20 feet away would have been safe. Of course some persons not over 20 feet away were unharmed without protection but that was good luck. Injury and death were due to being tossed about by blast effect, to being struck by objects actuated by blast, and to splinters or fragments of pavement or pavement thrown by explosion.

Damage in one store was exceedingly slight by direct hit, blast or explosion, but came chiefly by water from the breaking of one sprinkler head. The corner of one small garage annex was struck by a projectile which knocked off one or two cubic feet of the concrete foundation and splintered the corner of the woodwork but did not explode and did no injury to two people eight or ten feet away. All the observations of the writer indicate that on hearing a raid alarm it is imperative to get under the best cover that is nearby, and that side cover is most important, and roof cover next. If roof cover is not available, an open trench or the corner of a walled garage even if open to one side offer a large proportional safety.

Prepared by:

/s/ Chester K. Westworth,
CHESTER K. WESTWORTH,
Principal Geologist.

Approved by:

/s/ Frederick Ohrt,
FREDERICK OHRT,
Manager and Chief Engineer.

December 23, 1941

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 132 is a map of the City of Honolulu, reflecting points struck by projectiles, December 7, 1941, and is reproduced as Item No. 37 in Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

EXHIBIT NO. 153

STATEMENT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A RECORD OF CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Introduced by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Territory of Hawaii

[1] *To the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor attack*

I. Purpose of this statement

It is the understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Honorable Congressional Committee has as its objective an exhaustive investigation intended to present to the public a full report on all activities leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and that in carrying out this investigation all persons have been invited to present to the Committee any material, documents or other relevant information pertaining thereto.

It is the further understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Committee, in addition to its primary objective of bringing before the public any relevant information having any bearing or significance relative to a final determination of responsibility for that disaster, is also interested in correcting any deficiencies, omissions, misimpressions or incorrect conclusions or

inferences resulting from the reports of previous investigating committees or boards.

The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, on behalf of its member plantations, plantation agents, and the officials and individuals associated with these organizations, and on behalf of the Territory of Hawaii generally has therefore prepared this statement for the consideration of your Committee, with the request that it be entered into, and made a part of, the record of the Committee's investigation for three primary reasons:

First, it is believed that the information presented herewith, duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof has direct bearing upon the activities of the armed forces in this area prior to December 7, 1941; and

Second, it is conclusive proof of an outstanding record of cooperation with the armed forces in the fulfillment of their mission prior to the beginning of the war in the Pacific, as well as subsequent thereto, on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and individuals associated therewith and the Territory of Hawaii generally; and

Third, it is believed that the information presented herewith duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof, is conclusive proof of the error contained in certain testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack made by the Japanese Armed Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and is also conclusive proof of the falsity of the inferences and conclusions which could be drawn from the reading of the Report of said Board as released to the public on August 29, 1945, in that said Report incorporated excerpts of the testimony herewith objected to in a manner indicating that the statements contained in said testimony were accepted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [2] which thereby were capable of false and misleading impressions, and which in fact did result in false and misleading impressions in the public mind in that said testimony and the presentation in said Report intimated a lack of cooperation with the Army and the Army Commanders in Hawaii, which conclusion is erroneous, is entirely lacking in foundation, and has resulted in a grave injustice to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith and the people of Hawaii generally.

The testimony specifically objected to as presented before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are those portions of the testimony of Major General Henry T. Burgin, U. S. A., Commanding General of Artillery, Hawaiian Department, said excerpts of testimony being set forth on pages 174-177, inclusive of the report of said Board as released on Wednesday, 29 August 1945, by the Secretary to the President of the United States. The statements in said testimony were that (1) one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions; (2) that if General Short had gone to Alert #3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five; (3) that among those influential citizens whom he thought might have voiced their objection were, among others, Mr. Walker, a sugar man, General Wells, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar and other crops. The testimony to which objection is taken is set forth verbatim as Exhibit "A", appended herewith.

It is contended that the statements in this testimony before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in error, that the statements are entirely lacking in foundation, and that the inferences of lack of civilian cooperation in Hawaii with the Army and Army Commanders which inferences resulted from the inclusion of said testimony in the Report of the Army Board are likewise in error and lacking in foundation, and that the weight of the evidence supported by the records prove conclusively an outstanding record of cooperation in Hawaii on the part of the people generally, and in particular on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith.

Summary

The following statement presents to your Committee a record of cooperation with the armed forces prior to December 7, 1941, and thereafter on the part of

the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and officials and individuals connected or associated therewith, and on the part of the Territory of Hawaii, which, it is submitted, is an outstanding record of cooperation and assistance.

On the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations, this record of cooperation is one of established policy extending over a period of many years, built upon close relationship with the armed forces, and mutual recognition of the needs and requirements of the military and the contributions that could and have been made by the plantations in the defense plans of Hawaii. This policy of cooperation was further engendered and developed through the close liaison always maintained between the sugar industry and the military authorities by Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.) a former Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, who in 1934 was made Vice-President and Executive Secretary of the Hawaiian [3] Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army on completion of his tour of duty as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This established policy of cooperation is proven by the fact that sugar plantation lands were made available for Army use prior to Pearl Harbor on each and every occasion that the Army requested the use of such lands. It is demonstrated by the establishment as early as 1940 of an extensive plantation provisional police organization with the purpose of providing police organization for the primary purpose of providing aid and assistance in the defense of Hawaii and the fulfillment of the mission of the armed forces in Hawaii. It is demonstrated by the comprehensive emergency food subsistence program for Hawaii developed by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association long prior to the war, and the organization prior to the war of comprehensive civilian defense committees engaging in extensive preparedness activities under plantation auspices in close coordination with civilian and military authorities. All of these instances of close cooperation and coordination are further emphasized by the war record of the sugar plantations of Hawaii and of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in the aid and assistance given the armed forces on December 7, 1941 and thereafter, making available all plantation facilities, machinery, equipment, and manpower, in a period of critical emergency.

On the part of the people of the Territory of Hawaii it is submitted that the record of civilian preparedness activities prior to the war is outstanding for its appreciation of the emergency conditions existing in the Pacific long prior to Pearl Harbor. The readiness of the people of Hawaii to do whatever the military and naval commands might advise or desire and in many instances to undertake these preparedness activities on their own initiative, at considerable expense, with the firm conviction long prior to December seventh of the necessity for developing extensive defense preparations reflects to the lasting credit of the people of Hawaii.

This record of cooperation is presented hereafter in full. The preparedness activities of the civilian community of Hawaii is presented in the statements of persons in the community participating in the organization of these activities. It is submitted that these statements provide a complete refutation of the testimony referred to in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor and any inferences therefrom resulting from the inclusion of said testimony in the report of said Board. This record of cooperation with the military by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, and the officials and individuals connected therewith, and the record of civilian preparedness activities on the part of the people of Hawaii generally is submitted to your Committee with the request that it be made a part of the record of your Honorable Committee.

[4]

II.—*Certain Inferences of Lack of Civilian Cooperation in Hawaii as Contained in, and Resulting from, the Report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in Fact Conclusively Refuted Elsewhere in the Same Report.*

Certain inferences contained in said testimony are refuted elsewhere in the same report of said Army Board, although not specifically referred to in that portion of the report incorporating this testimony. For example, at page 59 of said report it is stated (italics added) :

"General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, 1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215). After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

"General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

'When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

"General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement,' (R. 226-227)"

And at page 78 (italics added):

"As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was affected, with ammunition at the guns. *The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron.* This is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection [5] of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533).

"It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different, from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. *Then, too, the newspapers oft-times contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility.*"

And further on page 79 (italics added):

"At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. *No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7.* It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but *in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.*

"We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

"We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells, executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and

Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than [6] speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress."

On pages 130-131 it is further stated (underlining added) :

"The third portion of the message (from the Chief of Staff's Message dated November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department) is this: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.'

"Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

"Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicated that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public."

These statements indicate that that portion of the testimony pertaining to objection on the part of influential citizens to an Alert #3, is itself refuted by the record and conclusions of the Army Board. The factual record supports this conclusion that the sugar plantations, and the Territory of Hawaii generally have at all times supported, assisted, and cooperated fully in all maneuvers, alerts, and other activities, training or otherwise, of the military authorities in Hawaii.

III.—The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its Member Plantations, the Plantation Agents and Officials and Individuals Associated Therewith Have as a Matter of Established Policy Cooperated in Every Way with the Army and Army Authorities

As to that portion of this testimony which was placed in the record, and thereafter the report of the Army Board, the statements to the effect that there was opposition from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions, the record of cooperation with the military on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations and their plantation agents is to the exact contrary, said record of cooperation being an outstanding one over a period of many years, reflecting in the written record thereof, cooperation which has presented no opposition to the military at any time in matters pertaining to requests connected with any defense preparation, plans and training, or other measures taken by the military. This record of cooperation is one commonly recognized, appreciated and accepted by former and present Army Commanders in this area.

To refute such statements and to acquaint your Committee with the record of cooperation of the sugar industry of the Territory of Hawaii with the Army and with Army authorities as a matter of policy, the files of all plantations and of the [7] Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association have been reviewed thoroughly. Endeavor has been made in the material presented hereafter to present a factual, complete picture of this record of cooperation, resulting from the established policy of the plantations to assist the armed forces in their needs and requirements. Supporting documents and records are included as exhibits. Brief statements of other community preparedness activities have been included to the extent that a true and accurate presentation can be made with brevity covering very extensive activities, where supporting documents would be voluminous.

Should the Committee desire additional material, records or other documents, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association is prepared to present such additional material at the convenience of the Committee.

IV.—Sugar Plantation Lands Were Made Available for Army Use Prior to Pearl Harbor Whenever The Army Requested The Use of Such Lands

The record of the sugar plantations in making lands available to the uses and requirements of the Army is an exceptional record extending over a period of many years. Since the major military activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor centered on Oahu, the location of Pearl Harbor, a study has been made of the requests made by the Army to Oahu sugar plantations during the period commencing in 1939 and extending up to December 7, 1941. This study involved a careful comprehensive review of all plantation records during this period. Review of all records of plantations and the records of the plantation agents discloses not a single instance in which *any* plantation denied entry to the Army. On the contrary every request, regardless of its nature, whether mere permission to use lands for a certain period or purpose without formal documents, or lease or license to enter, or entry prior to condemnation, was granted with promptness and complete cooperation, reflecting a mutual appreciation of the problems facing the military authorities which is illustrative of a high degree of coordination between civilian interests and the military which, it is contended, would not have been duplicated in any other part of the country.

The requests received by the plantations from the Army during the period mentioned totalled one hundred seventy-nine (179). Approval was given in every case. These requests were of various natures. For example, permission to carry out maneuvers on plantation roads and lands, to establish gun positions, either temporary or permanent, to install cable, radio and telephone communications lines, construct extension spurs to railroads, enter upon plantation lands for surveys for airfields and other installations, and a variety of other related military uses such as camouflage tests in cane lands.

These requests as granted by the seven plantations located on the Island of Oahu are graphically presented on the map attached herewith as Exhibit "B", made a part hereof.

The plantation boundary lines are approximate only, and encompass lands owned or under the control of the sugar plantations. Each black circle represents one request granted. All sugar plantations at one time or another granted blanket permission to the Army for maneuvers of infantry units, Artillery units, or the entire Hawaiian Department. Blanket permission so granted is reflected in shading the various plantations.

[8] Grouping of the circles in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor and Haleiwa reflect the greater concern of the military authorities with these areas. The fewer circles shown on the more remote plantations are indicative of lesser utilization by the military authorities of the lands of those plantations. It should be remembered that verbal authorizations granted, of which there were many, are not shown. Only requests supported by documents have been counted.

This visual presentation reflects the full cooperation at all times of all sugar plantations, regardless of the nature of the requests received by the plantations for the use of their lands. Without discussing each and every request, illustrative examples of the requests received, together with the authorization granted to the Army indicate how closely integrated the Army activities and plantation activities have been on Oahu and conclusively prove the high degree of cooperation. Without burdening down this statement with an exhaustive presentation, a few examples have been selected at random and are supported herewith by true copies of the substantiating documents.

Requests for permission to enter upon plantation lands were in many cases so common that blanket permission for the use of all plantation lands was often granted. In a letter dated November 8, 1940, Mr. James N. Orrick, the Manager of Kahuku Plantation Company, located on the North shore of Oahu, volunteered to Lieutenant General Herron, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to grant a blanket authorization covering the use of all the roads and lands under the control of the plantation for maneuver purposes, and including the use of plantation water and any other facilities deemed necessary to carry out maneuvers. In replying to this letter on November 13, 1940, Lieutenant General Herron stated:

"I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for any my appreciation of your very helpful offer."

Copies of this exchange of correspondence are set forth herewith in full in Exhibit "C".

Similarly by indorsement on February 17, 1941, blanket permission was granted by Oahu Sugar Company to the 64th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by the plantation. Copies of the exchange of correspondence between the Army Colonel Commanding the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) and the plantation manager are included in Exhibit "C". A similar authorization had previously been given on November 21, 1939, on an unlimited time basis by Honolulu Plantation Company to the same Coast Artillery unit. This correspondence is also included in Exhibit "C."

Similar blanket permissions were also granted by other plantations, and are recorded on the attached map.

Contrary to any of the statements concerning opposition from land owners relative to leases of land for gun positions, the records of the sugar plantations indicate that prompt and comprehensive authorization was at all times given whenever request was made by the Army authorities. Immediate entry was granted as a matter of established policy without requiring execution of the formal documents.

[9] For example, in June, 1941, the Real Estate Officer, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, was in the process of leasing three sites of approximately three acres each from Ewa plantation Company, two of which were required for anti-aircraft gun sites, the remaining one for a Sub-Sector Command Post. In a letter dated June 4, 1941, Mr. A. S. Davis, Vice-President of Ewa Plantation Company, pointed out that the plantation was prepared to discuss the terms and conditions of the lease and further added:

"If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document."

Copy of this letter is set forth in full in Exhibit "D".

A similar letter dated May 29, 1941, was sent by Mr. John H. Midkiff, Manager of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited to the same Real Estate Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, authorizing entry on plantation lands to permit immediate construction of eight gun emplacements, two mortar positions, and permanent trenches and fortifications, it being understood that maps delineating the specific areas would be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This authority was granted less than one week from the date of receipt of the request. Copy of this letter is included in Exhibit "D"

Similarly, when on April 25, 1941, Lieutenant General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, addressed a letter to Mr. H. A. Walker as President of Waianae Company, requesting that the Army be permitted to initiate construction of certain railway spurs across the plantation lands, pending final acceptance by the War Department of the license already granted to the Army to enter and use the plantation lands involved, the plantation through its agents, American Factors, Limited, of which Mr. Walker was President, authorized immediate entry. This authority for immediate entry was transmitted within three days of the time that General Short made his letter request. Exchange of this correspondence is set forth in Exhibit "D".

Other examples can be selected at random. It should be pointed out, moreover, that many of these requests involving troop maneuvers meant many hundreds or even a few thousand men and many vehicles using plantation roads and lands during maneuvers of individual units, as part of division maneuvers, or the entire Hawaiian Department, such maneuvers being scheduled in many instances as surprise alerts. There are attached herewith copies of three letters to Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd. and to Ewa Plantation Company with reply indorsement thereon authorizing use of lands for planned maneuvers during 1941, and reflecting the constant use of plantation lands by Army units. (Exhibit "E".)

A variety of other requests have been made in the past to the plantations by the Army and promptly granted in a spirit of complete cooperation. For example, in January 1941, the Commanding General of troops at Schofield Barracks desired to perform experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in

canefields. This assistance was immediately given by Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited. Exchange of correspondence is attached hereto in Exhibit "F".

At another time a request was addressed to Oahu Sugar Company requesting that new plantings of cane be started about five yards from the fence line at the Waipio Sub-Station (electric power station) in order that defense of the Sub-Station [10] against sabotage might be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective. This request was immediately recognized as set forth in the correspondence included in Exhibit "F".

Further evidence of the willingness of the plantations to cooperate in all matters pertaining to the defense potential of plantation facilities is reflected in a letter of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited dated July 21, 1939, furnished to various Army authorities including the Department Service Command at Fort Shafter which supplied the authorities with information relative to total employees, the racial groups, engineer and motor equipment available, railroad equipment, etc. Copy of this letter, included in Exhibit "F", is illustrative of the information which has been furnished by all plantations in response to Army requests.

Commanding officers have always been appreciative of this established policy of cooperation as evidenced by this active assistance promptly granted.

When Lieutenant General Herron relinquished his command of the Hawaiian Department to Major General Short in February, 1941, he addressed letters of appreciation to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association expressing appreciation for the continued and substantial contributions of the Association to National Defense. This letter concluded:

"Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and that we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii."

Copy of this letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "G".

Letters of appreciation were addressed by General Herron to the various plantations recognizing the cooperation given. Similarly, letters have been received from other commanding officers reflecting their appreciation for consistent cooperation. On June 3, 1940, the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks and Hawaiian Division, Major General Wm. H. Wilson, U. S. A., addressed letters to the plantations expressing appreciation for the cooperation given during the maneuvers in May 1940. Illustrative of these letters is that addressed to Oahu Sugar Company, Limited, included in Exhibit "G". This letter states:

"The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing Hawaiian Division to use land during this period."

Other phases of this continuous cooperation have been recognized, as for example in a letter from Lieutenant General Short, dated November 29, 1941, thanking Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of Oahu Sugar Company, for the assistance rendered in surveys, layouts and location of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa, although the original plans to locate an additional airport at that location was changed in favor of construction at Kahuku Point. This letter is set forth verbatim in Exhibit "G".

With such evidence of cooperation it is believed that the record of the plantations in making their lands available whenever requested by the Army and to whatever extent required is a record of complete cooperation. It is difficult therefore to understand for what purpose or on what basis the testimony protested herein, amounting as it did to a grave injustice to the Territory generally, could have been introduced in the record without factual support or to understand how the Army Board could therefore proceed to indicate [11] acceptance of this testimony without ascertaining the true factual record of cooperation.

V.—Organization of Sugar Plantation Provisional Police Guard in July, 1940

An outstanding example of a record of cooperation between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations with the Army is demonstrated in the early organization of the Plantation Provisional Police throughout the plantations on Oahu, commencing at the early date of July 30, 1940. Undertaking this program of organization of groups of employees trained in police work under leadership and guidance of trained police of the police

force of the City and County of Honolulu, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the plantations through the Oahu Sugar Managers' Association proceeded to develop an effective police organization whose objective was complete training to meet any emergency which might arise.

At a special meeting of the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association held at Waipahu on July 19, 1940, in conjunction with the Army and City and County Police authorities, Mr. T. G. S. Walker was appointed Coordinator of Plans for any emergency which might arise. In a confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, to all Sugar Plantation Managers on Oahu, the newly appointed Coordinator outlined the various alerts which the organization of the Provisional Police was intended to meet. Plan No. 1 envisioned an alert. Plan No. 2 envisioned "sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants, whether accompanied or not by hostile 'Blitzkrieg' from air or sea." This confidential memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "H".

No publicity was given to these initial plans nor to their purposes. Nor was any publicity given to the fact that the sugar plantations were undertaking this program in cooperation with Army authorities. In the confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, issued by the Coordinator, it was requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army. This was at the request of the Army authorities.

This organization contemplated, in addition to the actual organization and training of police, the procurement of any information bearing upon any phase of internal security. This is reflected by the transmission of Memorandums to the Coordinator and to the Chief of Police as early as July 31, 1940, setting forth lists of local Japanese on the plantations as well as pointing out incidents of rumors and their source, and the names and locations of any questionable characters.

At a meeting held at the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Board room on Tuesday, August 6, 1940, at which Major Melvin L. Craig, Department Provost Marshal, Major W. O. Poindexter, Provost Marshal's Office and the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson, and the Managers of all Oahu plantations were present, the Chief of Police presided requesting details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization. Districts and each beat boundaries were explained. A program of lectures at each of the plantations was outlined covering the next two weeks. A Memorandum of the Coordinator states relative to this meeting that

"Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid cooperation being shown by the Plantation Managers." (See Exhibit "I".)

Although it was never publicly expressed, the salary of the Coordinator, who was employed on a fulltime basis for the organization [12] tion of these provisional police, was paid entirely by the seven Oahu plantations, through the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association, on a pro rata basis.

The close coordination which was maintained by this voluntary organization with the Army forces of the Hawaiian Department and with the Police Forces, City and County of Honolulu, is shown by the provisional police plan for emergency guard divisions prepared by the Office of the Chief of Police on August 12, 1940, and issued over the signature of the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson. This plan issued as a confidential memorandum states that "the provisional police plan is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander." This plan is set forth in full as Exhibit "J". The plan divided the Island of Oahu into four police districts, Police District No. 1 embracing the City of Honolulu and the remaining three districts comprising the rural districts.

Dividing the rural districts into beats corresponding to the plantations and one beat comprising the three pineapple plantations, the plan then contemplated the selection of guards after careful scrutiny of their records, estimating that a grand total of 836 guards would be required for this plan. Prior to the date that the plan was to become effective, it was stated that the Army would furnish the Police Department a detailed map of installations to be guarded. Sugar plantation managers agreed to provide messing and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations. Until proper arrangements were made otherwise, the sugar plantations agreed to furnish the necessary

trucks, including one riot truck equipped with armor plates or sand bags and armed with machine guns and sufficient personnel, located at every police district headquarters. Tour of duty on each installation would be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of the plan. The plan also contemplated that arms, ammunition and equipment sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties would be furnished by the Army. This organizational plan was distributed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the Chief of Police, the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department and the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division.

On the basis of this provisional plan, and proceeding in cooperation with the plantation managers, the Coordinator proceeded to organize the necessary guards on each plantation. It should be pointed out that this organization was entirely separate from the units of regular plantation police.

Actual organization embraced much more than that of police guard. A memorandum of the Coordinator indicated that interest was being worked up in local food production, storage of food, establishing a fire alarm system and also emergency facilities and hospitals. Reports relative to Nazi or Japanese activity and rumors pertaining thereto were checked carefully at all times. Commencing in December, 1940, arrangements were made to give men from each plantation instruction in shooting on the police range.

The complete coordination between the Coordinator of Provisional Police plans, the plantation managers and the provisional police on the plantations and the Army authorities is reflected in a letter to the plantation managers from the Coordinator dated December 17, 1940, pointing out that the [13] Coordinator had been requested by the Army authorities to sit in on the Headquarters Staff exercises covering war conditions. The coordinator stated:

"During these exercises Col. Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the plantation managers and civic authorities.

"Col. Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the plantation managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regard to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Col. Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all plantations, the plantation managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief, and possibly myself acting as neutral judges."

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "K".

In December, 1940, it was arranged that General Herron visit Governor Poindexter to explain the urgency of finding some means, if possible, under the home guard defense laws by which funds could be drawn to uniform, equip, and give armed training to the provisional police guard. Apparently no action developed from this since the plantations continued to finance the arrangements whereby the continuation of this training was possible.

In February, 1941, during one of the frequent Army alerts, a meeting was held between Army authorities, the Chief of Police, and executives of the civilian personnel of District #1. Each was asked to give a short summary of their actions regarding their anti-sabotage precautions, etc. On the basis of this alert and this coordination with the civilian personnel comprising the police guard of District #1, the Coordinator made arrangements whereby the other districts were trained for immediate response to any alert. Although the meeting with the civilian defense group during the Army alert was called at one hour's notice by the Army authorities, every company notified was represented by its chief executive.

On March 8, 1941, the Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan furnished to all plantation managers and to the pineapple plantation representative, Wahiawa, the complete mobilization plan for the provisional police. At this time the sketches showing the "vital points" in the various districts which the Army wished the provisional police force to guard were not furnished but were withheld to be forwarded as soon as released by the Department Provost Marshal.

In May, 1941, the Army planned and carried through Hawaiian Department maneuvers. The provisional police were invited to participate in these maneuvers. Five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard did so participate. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army were designated to supervise and instruct the guard in the use of riot shotguns, as

reflected in the copy of letters of instructions dated May 5, 1941, from General Short to the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, set forth in full as Exhibit "L." Five rounds of ammunition per man were furnished by the Army. Silhouette type targets were provided. Instructions for guards at bridges and other installations to [14] guard against sabotage by persons approaching on the ground or descending from the air by parachutes were spelled out specifically. Reports indicated all guards performed satisfactorily, keen and alert in the performance of their duty.

Soon after this alert, T. G. S. Walker, Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan, was selected by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, to act as Coordinator of the Emergency Disaster Council commencing June 17, 1941. Major Douglas King, Assistant to the Chief of Police, was designated by Chief of Police Gabrielson to continue the work of Coordinator in matters pertaining to this police guard organization. Throughout the remaining months until December 7, 1941, instruction continued unabatedly. The Army was requested and did furnish the non-commissioned officers to give instruction in the use of firearms. Instruction talks by the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department Provost Marshal were arranged at the various provisional guard units. Courses of instruction in First Aid which the Army authorities considered most necessary were also undertaken.

Immediately prior to December 7, 1941, this provisional guard detail totalled between 1500 and 1800 plantation employees. This unit swung into action on December 7th assuming guard duties immediately according to prearranged plan, thereby relieving Army personnel for duty elsewhere. They stood at their posts for many hours during the early days of the war pending final arrangements whereby many of these men became air raid wardens, or assumed other active defense duties.

VI. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Developed a Comprehensive Emergency Food Subsistence Program Long Prior to the War

For a long period prior to the war, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had been directing attention to problems of local food subsistence. In 1935 the Association had created and established a Diversified Crops Committee composed of men representing all phases of agricultural activity in the Territory. Originally concerned primarily with study and research directed towards ascertaining what food crops could be grown in the tropical Hawaiian climate with profit to the growers and also as a phase of plantation activities, the Committee devoted considerable attention and effort to plans for producing locally crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence if any emergency stopped the flow of foodstuffs into the Territory from outside sources.

Successive Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department had been emphasizing subsistence food production as a major defense problem of the Territory, as a phase of the mission of the military forces. For a period of at least eight years before the emergency resulting from war in Europe, plans were being formulated, developed and revised by the Department Service Command and by the Civil Affairs Section, G-5, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

Being fully cognizant of the activities of the Army in emergency food subsistence planning, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army, had invited the Army to designate a representative to attend meetings of the Diversified [15] Crops Committee and work with the Committee in coordinated planning. Lt. Col. James A. Ulio had been designated in 1937 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and thereafter an Army representative was appointed each year. The close relationship between the Diversified Crops Committee and the Army authorities is reflected in a memorandum of Lt. Col. Ulio in 1937, explaining the objectives of the Diversified Crops Committee. Copy of this Memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "M".

In the latter part of 1940 the plans developed by the G-5 Section were officially made known to various civilian groups. With these expressions of mutual recognition by the military and civilian groups of the necessity for adequate planning to meet any emergency, new impetus was given to the activities of the Committee. The Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association also appointed a special food production committee which immediately undertook to determine

the extent to which pineapple lands on Oahu could be used to supplement cane and small farmers' lands in food production.

The close coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army is reflected in the letter dated February 1, 1941, of Lieutenant General Herron to the Association previously referred to and set forth in full as Exhibit "G". In this letter General Herron stated in part:

"The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crops Committee and its members."

In this connection, it should be kept in mind that every effort was made by the Trustees, President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association to include on the Committee expert agriculturists although they might not be directly employed by the sugar plantations or the Association. For example, the Standing Committee appointed by Mr. H. A. Walker as President for 1941 included Dr. H. L. Lyon, Chairman, Director of Experiment Station, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association; Mr. H. P. Agee, Agricultural Consultant for Castle & Cooke, Limited, sugar factors, and Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd; Dr. J. H. Beaumont, Director of the Experiment Station, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. D. L. Crawford, President, University of Hawaii; Dr. A. L. Dean, Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin, sugar factors; Col. Casey Hayes, G-5 Section, Hawaiian Department; Mr. L. D. Larsen, Director Plantation Activities, and Vice President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd., sugar factors; Mr. W. W. G. Moir, Agriculturist, American Factors, Ltd., sugar factors; and Mr. H. H. Warner, Director, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii. This representative group of agriculturists therefore included experts whose services the Army could not have obtained otherwise.

On January 30, 1941, sub-committees were appointed as active operating committees. These included an Animal Husbandry Sub-Committee, to promote production of meat, milk and eggs; a Chemical Supplies Sub-Committee, to ascertain requirements in fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, weed killers, etc., and take steps to insure an adequate supply of each; a Field Operations Sub-Committee, to plan appropriate food crops on requisitioned land in sufficient quantities to assure an adequate diet for every person on Oahu; an Inventories and Disbursements Sub-Committee, to keep track of the fluctuating food supply and advise as to its equitable distribution, with particular [16] attention to inventories and the promotion of food conservation and food storage; a new crops Sub-Committee, to locate and demonstrate new food crops that might be grown to advantage; the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association Relations Sub-Committee to coordinate the efforts in food production of the two respective organizations; and a Truck Gardens Sub-Committee, to stimulate production of truck crops on plantations, on small farms and in home gardens by independent growers. On February 7, 1941, an additional Army representative, Major A. R. Lamb, Sanitary Corps, was appointed to the Diversified Crops Committee as alternate for Colonel Hayes.

Indicative of the seriousness with which the Diversified Crops Committee undertook to develop comprehensive plans for emergency subsistence is the distinction made by it between plans developed for "Emergency A" and those developed for "Emergency B". "Emergency A" was defined as a condition of total blockade and complete isolation of Oahu from the mainland and off-islands. "Emergency B" contemplated a condition of total blockade and isolation of the Territory of Hawaii from the mainland or other sources of food and feeds.

Starting out in January, 1941, to develop intensively a plan of emergency subsistence for Oahu, the Field Operations Committee enlarged its personnel in May, 1941, by the addition of representatives on the islands of Maui, Hawaii and Kauai, with the additional responsibility of developing, with the assistance of the representatives of the Planters' Associations of the several islands, a Territorial emergency subsistence plan in which each of the islands might contribute to the subsistence of the civilian and military population of Oahu to an extent most consistent with their own and general Territorial interests. The enlargement of the Committee contemplated also the development of emergency subsistence plans for each of the islands with the assistance of the Planters' Associations of the several islands.

These efforts, directed as they were to the extreme emergency, Emergency "A", were entirely of a cooperative nature, to be coordinated with the military and government authorities. Final plans as submitted contemplated the requisition-

ing of lands, that good land would be taken out of cane production by authority of a food administrator, the withdrawal of such lands to be planted and managed in accordance with the plans developed.

Further indication of the close coordination between the committee of the HSPA and the Army is found in listing of appropriate food crops in the final plan as submitted on October 23, 1941, evolved to meet the extreme situation, Emergency A. The crops listed in the Army plan in September 1940, with two deletions and one addition were alone considered to be "appropriate food crops."

That the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Diversified Crops Committee and its sub-committees were at all times proceeding under clear recognition of the importance of the development of comprehensive emergency planning is clearly illustrated by the tone of a letter addressed to the then Territorial Governor, the Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, on June 19, 1941, signed by Harold L. Lyon, Chairman of the Diversified Crops Committee and Director of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, following a conference of General Wells, Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and Dr. Lyon with the Territorial Governor. He pointed out that the Committee had available at that date feasible plans for food and feed production in the Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a food Administration if, and when such Administration [17] was created. He also made clear the extremes which the Committee assumed for purposes of the planning:

"If the extreme situation develops—That is, complete isolation of Oahu—the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waianae, Kahuku, and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations."

This letter is set out in full as Exhibit "N".

In the first few months of 1941, the Diversified Crops Committee had already evolved extensive plans of such a complete nature that Walter C. Short, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, accepted the plans as submitted as the basis for all planning for Oahu. In a letter dated May 15, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, General Short stated:

"Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the 'Field Operations Committee' and for the 'Emergency Planting Plan' of the Diversified Crops Committee.

"I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute the basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

"In this connection I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Copy of this letter is set forth in Exhibit "O".

Efforts of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, and the various food specialists who had joined in the comprehensive emergency subsistence planning did not cease, however, with this approval, but continued throughout the rest of the year. On October 23, 1941, the Field Operations Committee submitted to the Diversified Crops Committee of the HSPA a complete "Emergency Food Production Plan," its comprehensiveness being indicated by the fact that it consisted of over one hundred and twenty-five pages of estimates, charts, graphs and compilations, representing a complete plan for any emergency. Commencing with careful estimates of the requirements for emergency subsistence rations for all the people in the Territory, the plan then specified the kinds of vegetables that should be grown, how many acres should be planted, how many pounds of seed obtained, what the initial seed orders should be, with computations of average yields per acre, and determination of the number of acres of sugar cane land, and pineapple lands to be planted and harvested each month and day. Fertilizer requirements were estimated for the various crops, and amounts determined on the basis of acreage requirements. Insect control requirements were also computed. Equipment, tools and machinery requirements were [18] also determined, and the number of the various kinds specified, with a listing of the priority of procurement. Tentative allotments of acreages of emergency crops among the various plantations were attempted with guidance from the military authorities in allotting subsistence food crops on Oahu to the four central plantations, Oahu Sugar Company Ltd., Waiialua Agricultural Company, Ltd., Ewa

Plantation Company, Ltd., and Hohlulu Plantation Company, Ltd., assigning forage and feed crops to Kahuku, Waianae and Waimanalo, located outside the pocket of Honolulu, Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks.

Assuming the necessary seeds and equipment were procured, and planting undertaken, it was still recognized that it would require considerable time for the crops to mature for harvesting. The Committee therefore compiled a list of staple foods and the amounts needed of each which the Committee recommended for storage and considered necessary to carry over an estimated six months period from the beginning of the emergency to the initial production of food crops. This list was later the basis for the imports and storage by the Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation acting in conjunction with the military authorities and the Food Control Section of the Office of the Military Governor.

The number of animals required, the number needed to be imported, the number that should be culled for economy of feed, the requirements of feeds and forage, and the acreages needed to be planted and harvested were computed carefully. The seed requirements for this feed were also tabulated, and the fertilizer needs for feed production, and the machinery required for feed crops. Considerations relative to increasing banana and papaya production and increasing the consumption of pineapples were explored carefully. Culture of yeast from sugar was explored as a means of supplying protein needs.

It was this plan which represented the culmination of years of attention and active experiments. It was this plan which the Army adopted as a basis for all emergency food subsistence planning.

As early as 1937, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had appropriated money for food crop experiments and continued these experiments at some expense over a period of years. Money was also appropriated for the purchase of agricultural equipment required for cultivation of these emergency food crops and some equipment was purchased and delivered prior to the outbreak of war.

Considerable optimism has always been expressed by the uninitiated over the possibilities of growing temperate climate food crops in Hawaii, and considerable effort has been directed to this. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association spent time and money, with all of the technical assistance of the extensive facilities of the experiment stations in experiments directed towards selectivity of suitable crops. The experiments conducted were without question worth many more times their cost, for they included the lessons gained from the experiments of expert talent familiar with climate and soil.

While these developments proceeded, in full coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army, other committees were established such as the Food Committee appointed by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, in 1940, the Governor's Committee on Food Storage in March 1941, and the Governor's Emergency Food Commission in June 1941. Membership of these committees was closely integrated [19] with that of the membership of the Diversified Crops Committee.

Subsequent to December 7, 1941, an Advisory Committee for Food Crop Production was established by the Military Governor. However, the experiments and plans of the Diversified Crops Committee, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, provided the basis for subsequent efforts directed towards local emergency food subsistence.

Any additional information desired relative to the extensive plans prepared for emergency food subsistence can be furnished promptly by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

VII.—Oahu Sugar Plantations Provided the Basis for the Development of an Efficient Civilian Defense Organization Throughout Rural Oahu Prior to the War

Having organized an extensive provisional police organization throughout all of the plantations as early as 1940, and participated in blackout practices as early as 1939, the plantations were prompt in undertaking the development of civilian defense organizations in 1941, so that by December 7, 1941, each plantation had trained its personnel to swing quickly into action when the emergency arose.

Early in August, 1941, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu appointed Mr. Stafford L. Austin, Manager of Honolulu Plantation Company, as a member of the Major Disaster Council. Mr. Austin proceeded immediately to organize

a Rural Oahu Committee, with districts corresponding to the areas occupied by the plantations except for the Wahiawa area composing the town of Wahiawa and the pineapple plantations, and the Kaneohe area on the windward side of Oahu. Each of these divisions was in turn in charge of the plantation manager, ho in turn supervised various defense committees which prepared plans and mobilized all available plantation facilities for defense emergencies.

An appreciation of the extensive and efficient preparedness organization possible under this procedure requires appreciation of the facilities which the plantations were able to make available. In addition to the executive talent, and the existing organization of superintendents, supervisors, and all plantation workers, there were all of the physical plant facilities of each plantation, including power and light, fire fighting equipment, trucks, cranes, and fully equipped, completely staffed hospitals. Accustomed to working as units, the plantations provided efficient organizations to develop promptly elaborate civilian defense preparations. The assistance which the plantations were able to provide on the morning of December 7, 1941, not only to civilians in the vicinity of plantations but also to Army and Navy personnel and installations is ample proof in itself of the close coordination of the plantations and the military authorities, the integration of the plantation facilities with the military requirements, and the effectiveness of the defense preparations made by all plantations.

Without burdening your Committee with an exhaustive presentation of the activities of each plantation in the development of civilian defense organizations, the organization developed by Honolulu Plantation Company provides an example of similar organizations developed by all plantations, closely coordinated through the Chairman of the Rural Oahu [20] Committee of the Major Disaster Council.

Throughout August and September, each plantation designated committees which proceeded to hold regular meetings, engage in training, and organize plantation facilities. Committees were established for the following: Transportation-Evacuation, Police, Medical, Fire and Air Raid Warning, Communication and Intelligence, Food Administration, Electric Power and Light, Rural Water, and Engineering. There is attached herewith as Exhibit "P", an outline of the Major Disaster Organization developed at Honolulu Plantation Company and distributed on October 3, 1941, by the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee to all Plantation districts.

The Fire and Air Raid Warning Committee proceeded to train its personnel, already trained in fire fighting, in the methods of handling incendiary bombs and fires resulting from other enemy action. This Committee distributed instructions, and conducted lectures and demonstrations for the education of the public in accordance with the procedure that became common throughout the mainland after the outbreak of the war.

The Medical Committee prepared plans to supply medical aid during the time of disaster, designating collecting points, conducting first aid training for all plantation personnel, and encouraging training of nurses. Since each plantation as a matter of policy had complete hospital and medical facilities engaged in the treatment of injuries and sickness of plantation personnel, and had long experience in the maintenance of public health, these additional preparations were able to be completed promptly and in manner hardly to be duplicated in any other mainland locality. Moreover, the location of the plantation hospitals throughout the island, and in many cases in close proximity to Army airfields and posts, and as in the case of Honolulu Plantation Company, within a few miles of Pearl Harbor, naturally resulted in attention being given to possible need of the plantation facilities for military personnel. Close liaison existed between the plantation doctors and Army and Navy Medical officers.

The Police Committee prepared plans for the protection of transportation routes, and the guarding of installations, the directing of traffic, maintenance of order in time of disaster, instruction of behavior in case of air raid alarm and of blackout, and the prevention of looting. The existing plantation provisional police provided personnel already trained for these functions and responsibilities.

The Food Administration Committee prepared plans for extensive company food production, coordinating these plans with the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. Educational campaigns were commenced for the development of home gardens.

The Transportation and Evacuation Committee prepared listings of all available transportation, and compiled organization charts for motor and rail transportation personnel. Maintenance of all equipment was a responsibility of this committee. In effect, the work of this committee was a pooling of all existing transportation facilities of the plantation to direct their utilization for emergency purposes when required, for operation and maintenance of equipment was of course part of the daily plantation operation.

The Communication and Intelligence Committee, in addition to communication liaison between the various headquarters of the Major Disaster Organization, also engaged in intelligence activities to ascertain any subversive activities, false rumors, unrest or other developments which might be of value to the military intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or which might be of assistance to the plantation provisional guard in maintaining order.

The Electric Power and Light Committee was organized for the purpose of proper maintenance of the plantation electric system which all persons, civilian and military, recognized as an important source of power for standby service in case of damage to the Hawaiian Electric Company plant, the island's main source of electric power.

The Rural Water Committee outlined alternate sources of water in case of destruction or obstruction of the existing system, and planned emergency transportation of drinking water if required.

The Engineering Committee was established to plan for construction of air raid shelters, and formation of damage repair crews.

These committees met regularly and were not mere paper committees. The plans developed by these committees at Honolulu Plantation Company were the basis for action on December 7, 1941, just as each plantation on Oahu was engaged in identical activities. First aid classes were well attended in close coordination between the plantation hospital staffs and the Medical Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu County Medical Society. Equipment needed in fighting fires resulting from enemy air raids was obtained and individual householders had been instructed to obtain necessary fire fighting equipment as early as September 27, 1941. This equipment was specified to include bags of sand, ladders, receptacles for spare water supply, and a fire extinguisher if possible.

Householders were encouraged to store additional food, and for this purpose basic subsistence items were imported in quantity by plantation stores. Special precautions were taken to keep careful account of all explosives, and in addition to the customary precautions additional inspections were made daily of all explosives stores. Close coordination was at all times maintained with the other plantations and the respective districts, and with the various committees of the Major Disaster Council.

The plantations, and plantation personnel, were proud of the civilian defense organization they developed and they are proud of the immediate response they were able to make on the morning of December 7, 1941. It is submitted that the civilian defense preparedness achieved by the sugar plantations through the organization of the various committees on each plantation, and coordinated through the Rural Oahu Committee of plantation managers, represents one of the best examples of such organizations then in existence.

There is attached herewith as Exhibit "Q" a report of the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee which presents in summary from the activities of the rural civilian defense divisions on the morning of December 7, 1941 and immediately thereafter.

[22] *VIII.—The Personnel and Facilities of Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Provided Immediate and Valuable Assistance to the Army and Navy in Meeting the Emergency Resulting from the Attack on Pearl Harbor.*

The preparedness of the plantation provisional police units has been discussed, as has the preparation of the Civilian Defense of Major Disaster Committees. These organizations undertook their assignments immediately. The planning of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, for emergency food subsistence, was utilized thereafter.

In addition to these pre-Pearl Harbor defense preparations by all of the sugar plantations, there was the further direct participation of the plantations with the Army and Navy in rallying to meet the sudden emergency. The material and in many ways almost indispensable aids provided to the Army and Navy by the sugar plantations on December 7, 1941 and thereafter was not alone the

uniting of forces to meet a common enemy. It was also organized assistance, reflecting the appreciation of the sugar industry over a long period of years of the integrated relationship existing between the sugar industry and the military authorities and the essential part of the plantations in the plans of the military for the defense of Hawaii.

At the request of Army authorities all sugar plantations had at various times prior to the war submitted information concerning the defense potential of the sugar plantations. There was every indication in the manner by which this information was requested and compiled that the Army considered the plantation facilities as an integral part of the plans of defense of Hawaii. The sugar plantations, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had proceeded accordingly. As has been previously pointed out, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, particularly under the guidance of the Vice-President and Executive Secretary, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, proceeded on established policy of close coordination and cooperation with the military forces.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, every plantation mobilized to aid the military forces in whatever way or manner assistance might be given. The war record of the sugar industry, particularly on that fateful day and for months thereafter is a record which would require volumes to record. It covers much more than civilian preparedness. It includes direct assistance to the armed forces themselves, in a manner that can be appreciated fully only as the location of the plantations in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, Army, Navy and Marine airfields and other installations is recognized with the extensive facilities of each plantation in machinery, equipment and manpower and the close relationship that has at all times existed between the plantation personnel and the personnel of the military forces, and the practical liaison with the military commanders which Major General Wells continued. It can truly be said that the sugar plantations were in the war immediately alongside the Army and Navy.

It is submitted that the part played by the sugar plantations in meeting this emergency has no parallel in any part of our country. A few examples serve to illustrate this.

[23] *Plantation Hospitals Received Many of the Wounded Service Personnel*

Some plantations were subjected to enemy strafing fire the morning of attack and suffered casualties. Plantation hospitals were immediately receiving victims of the attack. These casualties received at plantation hospitals on Oahu included Army, Navy and Marine personnel as well as civilians.

Plantation Equipment was Dispatched to Installations Attacked by the Enemy

Plantation trucks and cranes with plantation personnel to man the equipment were dispatched to Pearl Harbor, Ewa Marine Air Station, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and other Army and Navy installations as requested or required. Equipment dispatched by Ewa Plantation Company on the Seventh is illustrative of this aid and assistance. At the request of the Ewa Marine Aviation Group, three cranes and two caterpillar tractors with twelve equipment operators were engaged in aiding the Marine Air Station in the removal of aerial bombs from magazines and loading them on bomb carts and distributing the loaded bombs as directed. This crew stood by at the air station throughout the night of the Seventh. Another crane and two additional tractors were dispatched on December 8th to expedite this work. From that time until December 21, 1941, some Ewa Plantation men and equipment remained at the Marine Air Station. The men were even trained in fusing aerial bombs and placing them in the bomb racks of planes.

Shortly after the attack the Navy requested all possible assistance in supplying pumps, welding units, and cranes for use at Pearl Harbor. This equipment was dispatched promptly, remaining in use in some instances for many months.

Construction equipment from the plantations was made available throughout Oahu and all other islands for emergency construction of airfields and other installations. In many cases this equipment was of primary importance in making possible the rapid development and completion of airfields at a time when the utmost speed was essential to insure airfield facilities on Oahu, and the other islands.

Plantation Labor Provided a Large Construction Force for the Army

The pool of plantation manpower with many men trained in equipment operation was also available for emergency construction. Army recognition of the aid and assistance which the plantations could provide is reflected in the final pooling of these available resources for dispatch at the call of the military through a central Coordinator for the plantations. Through this central coordinator's office, foremen and skilled and unskilled laborers were dispatched to a great variety of projects. Coordination of this plantation labor was not limited to Oahu but included the other islands of Hawaii also, where the plantation labor supplied for Army construction was of extreme importance since the plantations were virtually the only source of labor on these islands and virtually no defense construction had been undertaken prior to the war, thereby emphasizing the urgency of construction which the plantations were able to expedite.

Stevadores and dock working crews were obtained from plantation labor, tractor and crane operators, carpenters, [24] welders, electricians, garage and machine shop mechanics, truck drivers, blacksmiths, painters, plumbers, sheetmetal workers, power plant operators, locomotive operators and trainmen, accountants—these categories of labor supplied by the plantations to the Army and reporting where directed, are illustrative of the type of labor furnished, well trained in their respective skills. Man-hours of labor supplied under this procedure to the Army during the time of emergency until the Army was able to recruit the necessary workers, both locally and from the mainland, illustrates the importance of this labor to the Army:

Year:	<i>Man-Days of Plantation Labor Supplied to Army Engineer</i>
1941 (December) -----	66, 034
1942 -----	390, 178
1943 -----	54, 394
1944 -----	3, 524
Total -----	514, 130

Power was Supplied from Plantation Electric Power Plants

On December seventh, all plantations immediately undertook standby service at their electric power plants as units in the island-wide coordination of generating plants. On a number of occasions subsequent to the Seventh, various plantations were called upon to carry the electrical load in their localities whenever emergencies arose such as those resulting from accidents, from major repairs, or emergency demands for additional power at the shops at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere. In these cases the coordination of the available sources of power through the central control of Hawaiian Electric Company proved of inestimable value to the armed forces in meeting the unprecedented demands for power that followed the enemy attack with the development of the defenses of Hawaii, and the expansion of the fleet repair shops at Pearl Harbor. Recognition by the military authorities of the value and importance of the plantation power facilities is demonstrated by the construction of a 300,000 gallon concrete fuel oil storage tank at Ewa Plantation to serve the plantation power plant. This construction was undertaken at the direction of the Corps of Engineers:

Plantation Repair Shops were Utilized Constantly by the Army and Navy

Following the attack, plantation machine shops were utilized for a wide variety of repairs as well as for the fabricating of substantial armament units. The machine shops of Ewa Plantation Company, for example, fabricated tank barriers, 30-caliber gun mounts, 37-, 75-, and 155-millimeter gun mounts, tank repair stands, and fuel storage tanks. Equipment was repaired and rebuilt. At this one plantation, 37 percent of the total man-hours worked by the machine shop crews during the period from January 1st to September 30th, 1942, was for the account of the Army.

Other plantation shops such as plumbing, carpenter, and blacksmith shops were similarly engaged in repair, fabrication and construction work for the armed forces.

[25] *Plantation Water and Inventories of Supplies were Available to the Armed Forces*

Plantation water supply systems proved of great aid to the armed forces at this time of emergency. An example of this is the furnishing of water to Barber's Point Naval Air Station and to Ewa Marine Air Station by Ewa Plantation Company. The scarcity of water on the arid Ewa plain presented a serious problem in normal times. Had the Navy been required to develop new sources of potable water before construction work could have started, valuable time would have been lost. Although furnishing of this water created a substantial drain on the plantation system, the plantation was able to maintain fairly constant pressure while meeting the Navy's requirements. From December 7, 1941 through September 1942, Ewa supplied the Navy a total of 77,260,000 gallons of water.

Miscellaneous materials were obtained from the plantations for a multitude of requirements particularly during the very early days of the war. The supply of sugar bags was immediately seized upon for the use of the armed forces and the civilian defense authorities to be filled with sand for protection of vital installations and gun positions.

Volunteer Units Were Formed With Plantation Personnel

Plantation Personnel was trained to form organized volunteer units to aid in guarding essential installations and in the active defense of Hawaii. These volunteer units, organized as regiments in rural Oahu and on the other islands were trained in the use of weapons and in combat methods, thereby providing assistance to the military through release of troops for other combat assignments. Organization of these units, with the organization of businessmen in Honolulu was accomplished in close coordination with the military authorities. These volunteer units, important as they were on Oahu, were of even greater importance on the other islands as troops were moved to forward areas for offensive operations.

These examples of the participation of the plantations in the defense of Hawaii can be no more than illustrative of the many activities in which the plantations engaged in active support of the military during the war. All plantations of Hawaii participated in this close coordination with the military forces. The role played by the plantations located on the islands of Hawaii other than Oahu was demonstrably of primary importance to the Army in the emergency of defense preparations.

It is submitted that here in the war record of Hawaii's sugar plantations there is more than response to a common emergency; that in this record there has been a degree of organized assistance which could have been achieved only after careful consideration and planning on the part that the plantations could play in an emergency as a natural phase of the close coordination and cooperation with the military forces which the management of the sugar industry and the officials of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had developed as a matter of established policy long prior to the war.

[26] *IX.—Under War Conditions and in Spite of Serious Limitations in Manpower, Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Continued to Maintain Sugar Production at Nearly Peacetime Levels During the War Years*

Sugar and its byproduct, molasses, have been basic agricultural commodities required in the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. It has long been recognized how essential it is that sugar production be maintained at the highest possible level. Hawaii's sugar plantations did not fail therefore to direct the utmost effort to continue the production of sugar in accordance with directives from Washington to exert every effort to this end.

Problems of decreasing manpower, as a result of the attraction of employment with the Army, Navy, and their Contractors, presented great difficulties. Equipment required for Army and Navy construction involved delays in planting and harvesting. Scarcity of materials affected maintenance and impeded operations. Blackout restrictions and other military regulations reduced the hours of work and resulted in problems of working conditions requiring constant adaptation.

In spite of these considerations, however, Hawaii's sugar plantations exerted additional effort towards meeting the multitude of problems presented, directing more intensive effort to achieving exceptional total tonnage production for these war years.

There is attached herewith as Exhibit "R" a chart comparing sugar cane acreage, sugar production, average number of male adult employees (unskilled) and total men days of all employees (unskilled) on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations from the period 1936 through 1944. This chart shows a production of 870,109 tons in 1942, 885,640 tons in 1943, and 874,947 tons in 1944. Hawaii's sugar industry is proud of this record, and the great contribution that this represents to the nation's successful prosecution of the war.

This record has not gone unacknowledged. By letter dated November 2, 1945, addressed to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, the Secretary of Agriculture acknowledged this production record in observing:

"The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful."

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "R".

X.—Conclusion

It is submitted that this record of the sugar industry in Hawaii in its cooperation with the military authorities in preparedness activities prior to the war, and in coordination of activities with the military throughout the war is an outstanding record, representing a complete refutation of any of the inferences and statements contained in the report [27] of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor which might reflect upon this record.

Hereafter there are attached the statements of persons in the civilian community of Hawaii who participated in the preparedness activities of the civilian community of Hawaii prior to the war. These illustrative statements are presented so that your Committee may be cognizant of the part played by the people of Hawaii to prepare for any emergency which might arise. It is submitted that the degree of civilian preparation thereby achieved reflects to the lasting credit of Hawaii.

It is respectfully requested that this statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association with the statements of civilian preparedness in Hawaii set forth hereafter be made a part of the record of your Committee to the end that the grave injustice to the Territory of Hawaii resulting from the incorrect and misleading statements and inferences in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor relative to Hawaii's cooperation with the Army during the critical period prior to the war may thereby be corrected in the manner which the excellent war record and preparedness activities of the sugar industry and Hawaii prior to the war so amply justifies.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
P. E. SPALDING, *President*.

DECEMBER 1, 1945.

I, Chauncey B. Wightman, of the City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, having seen the original documents from which copies were made and are attached as exhibits in the statement submitted herewith to the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate Pearl Harbor, submitted to the committee on behalf of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and their member plantations and the copies contained in the statements submitted by Mr. Alfred L. Castle, relative to the preparedness activities of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross; Mr. T. G. S. Walker, relative to the preparedness activities of the Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; Dr. H. L. Arnold, relative to the preparedness activities of the Medical Preparedness Committee, Honolulu County Medical Society; Dr. F. J. Pinkerton, relative to the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank; Addison E. Kirk, relative to the preparedness activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu; and Mr. Heaton L. Wrenn, relative to the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Police Reserve, do hereby certify that said copies as contained in this statement submitted herewith to the Joint

Congressional Committee to Investigate Pearl Harbor are true and exact copies of the original documents thereof.

Chauncey B. Wightman
CHAUNCEY B. WIGHTMAN.

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
City and County of Honolulu, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of January, 1946.

[SEAL]

ALBERTA VAN BROCKLIN,

Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My Commission expires 6-30-1949.

[28] EXHIBIT "A"—EXCERPT OF TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN BEFORE ARMY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE PEARL HARBOR (ARMY BOARD REPORT, PP. 173-177 INCLUSIVE)

3. *Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses.* General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Command * * * For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions, they would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7. * * * On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602-2604).

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not. [29] even put his guns into final position because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

"General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

"General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition to the people who owned the land?

"General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

"General RUSSELL. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?

"General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

"General RUSSELL. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

"General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.

"General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

"General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

"General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?

[30] "General BURGIN. Oh, my!

"General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?

"General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

"General FRANK. Which Walker?

"General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R. 2629)

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in Selecting Alert Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and later from the large commercial interests on the island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 2654)

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)

[32]

EXHIBIT "C"

NOVEMBER 8, 1940.

Lieutenant General C. D. HERRON,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL HERRON: During the past 17 years the Army has at times used our roads and lands for maneuvers and each time your staff has requested our permission before carrying out these exercises. During this period we have never had an occasion to complain about the condition in which our roads and lands were left by the Officers and men under your command. With this in mind I wonder if, during these strenuous times, it would be of any help to you and your staff to have for maneuvering purposes, a blanket okeh covering the use of the roads and lands under our control. If so, I will be glad to have it forwarded immediately.

This will also cover the use of plantation water and any other facilities that you might deem necessary to successfully carry out maneuvers.

If there is any other way in which we can cooperate please do not hesitate to call on us.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ JAMES N. ORRICK,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company.

JNO:L

[33] Commanding General

WAR DEPARTMENT,
 HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, November 13, 1940.

To: Mr. JAMES N. ORRICK,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company, Kahuku, Hawaii.

MY DEAR MR. ORRICK: I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of the plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for and my appreciation of your very helpful offer.

We shall be delighted to have the blanket permission and I trust that should any transgression occur, as it must in time, you will immediately notify us in order that we may make prompt restitution and take the necessary preventive measures against repetition.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ C. D. HERRON
 C. D. HERRON,
*Lieutenant General,
 Commanding.*

[34]

NOVEMBER 18, 1940.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
 Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H.*

DEAR SIR: Until further notice you and your command are hereby permitted for maneuvering purposes the free use at any time of all roads and lands under our control at Kahuku.

Permission is also granted for the withdrawal of domestic water from the pipeline situate on the Kamehameha Highway near our Main Store at Kakuku.

Yours very truly,

KAHUKU PLANTATION COMPANY,
 /s/ JAMES N. ORRICK, *Manager.*

[35]

HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA)
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 11, 1941.

In reply refer to: 680

OAHU SUGAR Co.,
Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment must use positions, usually on the sides of roads, for searchlight units. Each of these units consists of about ten men and the searchlight equipment. The units arrive at the positions just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart. Four of these positions are located on your property.

1. 1000 yards southeast of pump camp #5 at first locked gate on the road to Manawahua.
2. At a railroad crossing 0.6 miles north of the road which begins just west of the Waipahu Grade School.
3. On a cane field road at the east end of the stables which are just off Kunia Road near Kunia Camp #1.
4. On cane field road at the southwest edge of a reservoir by the camp 1 1/4 miles north of Ewa Junction and about 1/4 mile east of Kam Highway.

As the various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied, and as each position requires permission it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefore requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by you.

This of course would be granted with positive assurance that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,

Colonel, 64th CA (AA) Commanding.

WAIPAHAU, OAHU, T. H., February 17, 1941.

To: Colonel C. K. Wing, Commanding 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, T. H.

Permission to use specific positions as described in the [36] above letter is hereby granted.

Your request for blanket authority to move to other positions not specifically described herein is also granted.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED,
(Signed) H. L'ORANGE, Manager.

HL'O:W

[37]

HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA),
Fort Shafter, T. H., November 16, 1939.

In reply refer to: 680 (P&T)

HONOLULU PLANTATION Co.,
Aiea, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment is in need of positions usually along side of roads to place small groups of men with equipment such as searchlight units with a crew of about 8 to 10 men. Some of the desired positions are located on property belonging to or controlled by your company. It is requested that permission be granted this regiment to place these groups of men with their equipment of the following locations:

- A position on Aiea Heights
- A position on Red Hill

The men arrive at these positions with their equipment just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart.

As these various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied and as each position requires permission, it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefore requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions on the property owned or controlled by you from time to time. This of course would be granted with positive assertion that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property and interference with traffic on roads.

Very truly yours,

/s/ C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA),
Commanding.

[38]

NOVEMBER 21ST, 1939.

Colonel C. W. WING,
Commanding, 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, Oahu.

DEAR SIR: We will be pleased to grant you permission to occupy any position you wish, on the plantation, so you may carry out your various missions and plans, as requested in the last paragraph of your letter of November 16th, 1939.

Yours truly,

HOUOLULU PLANTATION COMPANY,
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN, Manager,

SLA: ESB

[39]

EXHIBIT "D"

JUNE 4, 1941.

Captain J. E. YOUNG, Q. M. C.,
Real Estate Officer, Fort Shafter, T. H.

LAND MATTERS

DEAR SIR:

In connection with Ewa Plantation Company's leasing to the Army of three sites of approximately three acres each (not referred to in our letter to you of May 29, 1941) the locations of which were tentatively agreed upon between Acting Manager Slater Miller and your Lieutenant Colonels Lynd and Taliaferro, we wish to say in this respect that Ewa Plantation Company is prepared to discuss with you the terms and conditions to be embodied in such a lease, and for this purpose we accordingly ask that you telephone or write us to arrange a place and date of meeting.

As we understand, the site proposed by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Lynd for the Sub-Sector Command Post lies in the vicinity of Ewa Field 20.1 crossed by the 200-foot contour ditch. Of the other two sites selected by Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Taliaferro for anti-aircraft gun sites, one lies in the reclaimed area adjacent to Ewa Field 64 and the other on the North slopes of Honouliuli Valley in the neighborhood of Ewa Field 32.

For your information, before any lease can be entered into with the Army covering these three sites, we believe it will be necessary for you to locate same on the ground and prepare maps and descriptions. Further, if you intend to record the lease, it will require the subdivision, for land court purposes, of certain lots on which these sites are located, all such work to be undertaken at your expense.

If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document. If, in the immediate taking of such areas, cane crops are thereby damaged, you will reimburse or compensate Ewa Plantation Company for all such crop damages and all other damages incidental to such taking.

Very truly yours,

/s/ A. S. D.
A. S. DAVIS,
Vice-President, Ewa Plantation Company.

[40]

MAY 29, 1941.

QM 660. C-RE (Gen.)

Captain J. E. YOUNG,

*Q. M. Corps, Real Estate Officer,**Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR SIR: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 May, 1941, requesting confirmation of verbal permission for the use of certain small areas of land by the War Department for military purposes.

Permission is hereby granted the War Department for military use, as requested, of the small areas of land desired. It is understood that maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This permission covers the following approximate sites:

Seven gun emplacements and three bomb-proof shelters to be constructed at various locations along Puuiki Beach, all located on Lot A of Land Court Application 1089.

One gun emplacement at Kaiaka Bay, located on Grant 1976, Apana 3, under lease to Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from Dortha Emerson.

Two mortar positions, located on land leased from the Bishop Estate by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., near the City of County Reservoir at Haleiwa.

Permanent trenches and fortifications, located just above the Wahiawa Ditch and below the road leading across Helemano 6 Reservoir on Land Commission Award 7713, Apana 34.

The permission to use these various sites for military purposes is granted subject to the following provisions:

1. No growing crops are to be disturbed.
2. No plantation facilities, such as irrigation ditches, pipe lines, etc., are to be disturbed without making prior arrangements.
3. All fences or gates leading to the various sites will be closed at all times.
4. That the use of these various sites by the government will not in any way constitute a release of title to the land by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.
5. The permission granted for the use of lands which are leased by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from other parties only extends until the expiration of the leases involved.

6. Permission to use the above sites is granted for the extent of the present National Emergency, and in the event that the use of sites is desired beyond said emergency, [41] then it is felt that same should be covered by a formal document properly executed by all parties and interests.

I hope this fulfills your immediate request and that it will serve until the necessary formal instruments can be prepared for approval.

Very truly yours,

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., LTD.,
/s/ JOHN H. MIDKIFF, *Manager.*

JM: mhs

[42]

MAY 1, 1941.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SIR:

LICENSE FOR RAILWAY ON WAIANAE CO. LAND

Referring to your letter of April 28th, Engr. 662/7, requesting permission to enter at once upon the land of Waianae Company at Mailli, Laulaulei, Oahu, for the purpose of constructing railway spurs authorized under license, the execution of which by the War Department is now pending, please be advised that on behalf of said Company, you are hereby authorized to make immediate entry upon said land for the purpose specified.

Your very truly,

AMERICAN FACTORS, LIMITED,
/s/ C. T. B.
C. T. BAILEY,
Manager, Land Department.

CTB: LL

[43]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Apr. 28, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 662/7

Mr. H. A. WALKER,
President, Waianae Company,
% American Factors, Limited, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. WALKER: This is to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Bailey's letter dated 17 April 1941 transmitting to me a document and three duplicate copies of a license for the railway to be located on the land owned by your company at Mail, Luahualei, Oahu.

Pending final acceptance of this document by the Secretary of War, it is requested that the Army be permitted to initiate the construction of these spurs.

I desire to express my sincere thanks for your prompt and helpful attitude that you and other officers of your Company have adopted toward the furtherance of this military project. Your hearty cooperation exemplified fine support of the national defense of your country.

Very truly yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[44]

EXHIBIT "E"
HEADQUARTERS 24TH DIVISION ARTILLERY,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., November 6, 1941.

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL Co.,
Waialua, T. H.

Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Mngr.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
164-----	60	12	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	Hq 24 Div Arty.
164-----	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
180-----	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
322-----	400	50	ROOP-K	Nov 25-26	AM-PM	13th FA.
123-----	140	20	ROOP-K	Nov 24	AM-PM	13th FA.
161-----	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 24	AM-PM	Hq Btry 52 FA.
161-----	140	20	ROOP-K	Nov. 27	AM-PM	HQ & B, 13 FA.
180-----	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 25	AM-PM	Btry B, 52 FA.
180-----	60	10	ROOP-K	Nov 26	AM-PM	Hq Btry, 52 FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed land will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Rox. H. Donaldson
ROX. H. DONALDSON,
Major, 24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer.

First Endorsement

NOVEMBER 7, 1941.

To Major ROX. H. DONALDSON
24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Approved.

/s/ Joseph Matson, Jr.
JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Civil Engineer, Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

JM:mbs

[45]

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, March 25, 1941.

MR. H. R. SHAW,
Waiialua Agricultural Co., Waiialua, Oahu.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
Johanna.....	70	10	RSOP.....	April 7.....	A. M.	13th FA.
Johanna.....	100	12	Reconnaissance	April 11.....	A. M.	13th FA.
Johanna.....	300	40	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13th FA.
Anahulu.....	350	50	RSOP-K.....	April 7-8.....	Day & Night..	13th FA.
Anahulu.....	350	50	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	11-8th FA.
Euc. Forest.....	350	50	RSOP-K.....	April 7-8.....	Day & Night..	13th FA.
Euc. Forest.....	100	12	Reconnaissance	April 21.....	A. M.	13th FA.
Euc. Forest.....	350	50	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13-8th FA.
Brig. Woods.....	150	15	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13th FA.
ERA Camp.....	150	15	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13th-8th FA.
Kaiaka Point.....	10	2	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13th FA.
Puiki Woods.....	50	5	Camp-K.....	April 14-17.....	Day & Night..	13th-8th FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde,
R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

Note: Areas for April 14-17 are for North Shore maneuver, we do not know definitely which will be used, but may, at one time or other, have to use all.

WAIALUA, T. H., March 28, 1941.

Permission granted. No exceptions.

/s/ Harold R. Shaw,
HAROLD R. SHAW,
Waiialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

[46]

HEADQUARTERS,
ELEVENTH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, Sept. 5, 1941.

EWA PLANTATION CO.,
Ewa, Oahu, T. H.

(Att. Mr. S. M. Miller, Field Superd.)

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

Area	Men	Vehicles	Purpose	Date	Time	Unit
260.....	70	10	RSOP-K.....	Sept. 22, 1941	All Day.....	Hq. 1st Bn 13th FA.
260.....	70	10	RSOP-K.....	Sept. 25, 1941	All Day.....	Btry. C 13th FA.
262.....	70	10	RSOP-K.....	Oct. 3, 1941	All Day.....	Btry. A 13th FA.
277.....	70	10	RSOP-K.....	Oct. 3, 1941	All Day.....	Btry. B 13th FA.

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. B. HOOD,
Major, 11th F. A. Brigade.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1941.

EWA PLANTATION COMPANY,
Approved.

/s/ S. M. MILLER.

"Restricted"

[47]

EXHIBIT "F"

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., *January 13, 1941.*

Mr. H. R. SHAW,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Waialua, T. H.

DEAR MR. SHAW: There follows a very peculiar request. General Murray is very anxious to make some experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in cane fields. In order to accomplish this we have to have the cooperation of some plantation. You and the Waialua Co. have been most cooperative and for that reason I feel that I may be "working a willing horse to death." Please feel free to refuse if you so desire.

Here is the proposition: We would like two plots of cane approximately 40' x 40', one side of which to be directly on a road with no irrigation ditch to cross. Some of the cane will be cut out of these plots and we will run a gun into each, stretch a camouflage net over it and experiment with various methods of placing the cut cane on the nets until we find the method which shows least change in an air photo. This experiment to be made during February 25-27. We need a full growth of cane to get as much height as possible and thought if you were planning to burn a field about that time, the cane cut for the experiment would not be wasted.

I realize that you are in business and that your concern is not set up be an auxiliary to the Army, so please be frank in your reaction to this request.

Cane, covering so much of the lowlands, as you know, is one of our problems and we can think of no other way to solve it.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde
R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

OK
M

[48]

JANUARY 14, 1941.

CAPTAIN R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
*11th Field Artillery Brigade,
Schofield Barracks, T. H.*

DEAR CAPTAIN VAN DE VELDE: Your request of January 13th for cane areas in which to make tests on camouflaged gun positions has been received, and I believe we can make the necessary arrangements.

As you anticipated, it would be necessary to arrange the test in an area which would be harvested within three days of the date of the experiment. Whether an area which would suit your purpose from the viewpoint of roadset and topography would be available between the exact dates of February 25-27 cannot be predicted this far in advance.

My suggestion would be that about February 15-20 we make an inspection together of the areas which will be harvested between that time and March 1st. By choosing several alternate positions, I could notify you several days in advance of the date each area is to be cut, and you could make final arrangements as influenced by availability of a gun battery or of Air Corps participation.

As always, we shall be happy to cooperate with the Army in this experiment, and are sure that you will cooperate to minimize disturbance of our normal production operations.

Very truly yours,

HAROLD R. SHAW,
Waiialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

[49]

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Superintendent,
Oahu Sugar Plantation Co.

DEAR SIR: It has been brought to my attention recently that the property adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station has been cleared of cane.

If it would be convenient to you I would like to request that new plantings be started about five (5) yards from the fence line in order that defense of the Sub Station against sabotage may be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective.

Sincerely yours,

/sgd/ Wm. A. McCulloch,
WM. A. McCULLOCH,
Colonel, 27th Infantry,
Commanding.

[50]

SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.
41/1041

WM. A. McCULLOCH
Colonel, 27th Infantry
Commanding Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter of September 23, 1941 please be advised that new plantings of cane in the area adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station will be started five (5) yards from the fence line.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED.
(Signed) H. L'ORANGE, Manager.

HL'O:M

[51]

Lieut. CLYDE R. McBRIDE,
2nd Bn., 13th Field Artillery,
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

JULY 21, 1939.

DEAR SIR: In reference to your letter of July 17, 1939 requesting data on the Waiialua Plantation of possible military interest and value, we are glad to supply the following information:

(A) Personnel data as of June 30, 1939:

Ancestry	(1) Adult Male Personnel Employed			(2) Total Plantation Population			
	Citizen	Non-Citizen	Total	Men	Women	Children	Total
Japanese.....	275	176	451	536	425	833	1,794
Filipino.....	17	808	825	804	152	501	1,457
Chinese.....	5	5	10	14	6	17	37
Korean.....	14	20	34	46	34	68	148
Porto-Rican.....	12	10	22	27	18	45	50
Portuguese.....	110	9	119	137	119	171	447
Hawaiian.....	24		24	26	14	23	63
Anglo-Saxon.....	57	1	58	62	60	51	173
All Others.....	17		17	18	10	25	53
Total.....	531	1,029	1,560	1,670	838	1,754	4,262

Estimated total population of Haleiwa Village (Non-Plantation)----- 4,000

(B) Engineer and Motor Equipment Available:

(1) Trucks and Trailers, 19.

Total Cargo Capacity, 65 Tons.

Passenger Capacity, 1105 persons.

(2) Tractors rated by horsepower:

HP	22	30	35	40	65	70	75	95	Total
No.	13	2	1	5	2	2	2	2	29

(3) Miscellaneous Engineer Material:

Mobile Cane Loaders, 7.

Excavator Bucket, 1.

Drag Line Bucket, 2.

Road Grader, 10', 1.

Bull-dozers, 2.

Tractor-trailers, 3.

Heavy Breaking Plows, 2.

Heavy Disc Plows, 2.

Portable Air Compressors, 2.

Portable Welding Machines, 2.

Portable Concrete Mixers, 2.

Detailed list of hand tools and normal warehouse supply submitted to Department Service Command in August, 1938.

(C) Railroad Equipment:

(1) Length Permanent Narrow-Gage Main Line, 55¼ miles.

(2) Length Portable Track (12-foot section), 10 miles.

(3) Number of Locomotives, 7.

(4) Number of Cane Cars (3 to 4 tons cargo capacity), 736.

(5) Number of Labor Cars (Beating Capacity—25 men), 25.

(6) Number of Flat Cars, 36.

(7) Number of Oil Cars, 2.

[52] (D) Time required to lay one mile narrow gage portable track approximately 20 mandays of 8 hours. Our average figure to date for 16-man crews in each harvest field is 3.83 man-days for 1,000 feet of portable track.

(E) Time necessary to burn and clear one acre of cane land highly variable, depending on weather conditions and yield of cane, and whether for commercial or military purposes. A working approximation would be 8 man-days to burn and cut one acre of cane, plus 7 man-days with proper equipment to load and clear the area.

(F) Possibility of cutting off water supply of Haleiwa and Waialua not feasible at individual sources of supply, as we maintain 19 pumps supplying 108 million gallons per 24 hours from 114 wells. Destruction of power plant at (1) Waialua Mill and (2) Hawaiian Electric Transformer station, and of concrete reservoir at Haleiwa would probably accomplish purpose.

(G) Plantation roads and ditches are semi-permanent in the sense that they are placed on key terrain features, and are seldom moved.

(H) The legend that plantation water supply is poisoned is entirely mythical. Practically all pump water is potable but subject to contamination in open channels; gravity mountain water is usually very turbid as well. During a few months of the year, fertilizer is applied in the irrigation water within the field but not in main supply canals. Arsenic herbicides are applied directly to vegetation along roads and ditches and within cane fields—never in the irrigation water.

(I) Other Features of Possible Interest:

(1) The plantation maintains complete shops for railroad, electrical and mechanical repairs. Detailed list of power tools available submitted to Department Service Command, August, 1938.

(2) Electric Power—Mill Power Plant, 3,000 KWH; Hydroelectric plant near Brigade Woods, 385 KWH.

(3) Billeting—total number of dwellings, 1,087; average floor area per dwelling, 900 square feet.

(4) Livestock—65 mules, 15 pack-mules, 14 horses.

(5) Wahiawa Tunnel—four miles long, 4 feet by 6 feet cross section, gives completely covered and concealed route for foot troops from Kaukonahua Bridge near Artillery Gate, Schofield, to Brigade Woods.

A similar tunnel on east side of Kawalloa Gulch gives covered approach from Wahiawa-Pupukea Road to Eucalyptus Forest.

Very truly yours,

H. P. SHAW,
Irrigation Overseer.

HPS: es.

cc: Department Service

Command, Fort Shafter, T. H.

A. C. of S., G-3 Hawaiian Division, Schofield Barracks

S-3, 21st Infantry Brigade, Schofield Barracks

S-3, 27th Infantry, Schofield Barracks

Mr. C. R. Sischoff

[53]

EXHIBIT "G"

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, February 1, 1941.

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: It would be unseemly and ungrateful to quit my command of the Hawaiian Department without expressing the appreciation of the Army for the continued and substantial contributions of your Association to National Defense.

The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crop Committee and its members.

Your Forester, Mr. George A. McEldowney, has for many years in his own time advised and assisted the Schofield Barracks authorities in their reforestation program and the very substantial progress made in the last two years is largely due to him.

Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii.

With all good wishes and sincere thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

C. D. HERBON,
*Lieutenant General,
Commanding.*

[54]

HEADQUARTERS SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
AND HAWAIIAN DIVISION,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., June 3, 1940.

In reply refer to: 354.2 (6-3-40) 4

Mr. HANS L'ORANGE,

Manager, Oahu Sugar Company,

Waipahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. L'ORANGE: The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing the Hawaiian Division to use land during this period.

Every effort was made to prevent damage to property and inconvenience to land owners. A survey is being made to insure the repair of any damages caused by troops during maneuvers. If property, under your control, has been damaged, incident to its use by troops, a report from you giving details will be appreciated.

Please accept my appreciation for your cooperation and generosity in allowing the army to use your lands during this maneuver, and for all past favors.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) Wm. H. Wilson
WM. H. WILSON,
*Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.*

[55]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Nov. 29, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Kipapa)

Mr. HANS L'ORANGE,
Manager, Waipahu Plantation,
Waipahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. L'ORANGE: After considerable study and investigation, the War Department has decided that the additional airport to be constructed on this Island should be located in the vicinity of Kahuku Point rather than in the vicinity of Kipapa Gulch where I originally recommended its construction.

I wish to thank you for your efforts in assisting members of my Staff with the location, surveys and layouts of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa. Your knowledge of local conditions was of great value in this study. Since there is still a possibility of future expansion of the air forces in this department, Kipapa may re-enter the picture at some later date. However, all action upon that site has been stopped at the present time.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[56]

EXHIBIT "H"

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, July 30, 1940.

Confidential Memorandum
To All Sugar Plantation Managers Oahu, T. H.

Owing to current events, the Oahu Sugar Managers Association at a special meeting held at Waipahu July 19th, in conjunction with the Army and Police Authorities, appointed the writer as co-ordinator of plans for any Emergency which might arise. It was, however, carefully pointed out that this is purely a precautionary measure and does not necessarily denote a belief that such an Emergency is near or even bound to come.

However, the Plantation Managers are faced with the necessity of having plans for two phases.

I. The Alert—Plan No. 1.

II. Sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants whether accompanied or not by hostile "Blitzkrieg" from air or sea—Plan No. 2

Plan No. 1:

This will come in force the instant that information received or other indications denote the advisability of putting in precautionary measures. This plan is taking shape rapidly, and I hope to report to you more fully on this in the next week or so.

However, it might be well for you to remember that the Alert will probably mean that:

- (a) As far as possible Plantation work should proceed as normally as possible.
- (b) Previous plans to keep people calm should be put in force.
- (c) All personnel for guard duty, transportation, housing facilities, etc., promised under this plan would probably be immediately required by the Police.
- (d) Further guards for your own private property and buildings would be required. Cane fire preventive patrols might be advisable.
- (e) Arrangements for putting plan No. 2 into effect would have to be made.

Plan No. 2:

I will discuss this in a future memorandum and also verbally with individual managers.

[57] It is requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the Police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army.

Yours very truly,

/s/ T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-ordinator Emergency Plan.

[58]

EXHIBIT "I"

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
Honolulu, T. H.

Confidential

Memorandum: *Provisional Police Plan*

A meeting was held at the H. S. P. A. Board Room 10 A. M. Tuesday, August 6th, 1940.

The following were present: Major Melvin L. Craig, Major W. O. Poindexter, Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, Mr. George Y. Bennett, Waimanalo Sugar Co.; Mr. J. N. Orrick, Kahuku Plantation Co.; Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Waialua Agricultural Co.; Mr. Hans L'Orange, Oahu Sugar Co.; Mr. J. D. Bond, Ewa Plantation Co.; Mr. Robert Fricke, Waianae Plantation Co.; Mr. S. L. Austin, Honolulu Plantation Co.; Mr. T. G. S. Walker.

Chief of Police Gabrielson presided. Details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization were discussed. District and Beat Boundaries were explained.

Dates for lectures by Police to Provisional Police were fixed as follows:

Kahuku Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waimanalo Plantation Co., 7:15 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waianae Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Ewa Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Waialua Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Wed. August 21.
Waipahu Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Wed., August 21.
Honolulu Plantation Co., 4:30 P. M., Thurs. August 22.

Subsequent meetings will be announced later, though it was thought if possible lectures and instructions should be given weekly at same time and place until course is finished.

Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid co-operation being shown by the Plantation Managers.

Meeting adjourned 11:20 A. M.

/s/ T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-Ordinator Provisional Police Plan.

[59]

EXHIBIT "J"

Confidential

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 12, 1940.

PROVISIONAL POLICE PLAN FOR EMERGENCY GUARD DIVISION

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION BY THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE VOLUNTARY GUARD DIVISION

Maps: Island of Oahu 1/62,500 w/4 overlays attached hereto; Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (SECRET) showing Signal Corps installations to be distributed by Army when emergency occurs.

1. The Provisional Police Plant is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission, the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander.

2. The Island of Oahu is divided into four (4) police districts, namely, Police District No. 1, City of Honolulu; and Police Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4, comprising the rural districts.

3. a. There will be a Captain of Police in charge of the Provisional Guard Division, who will have two assistants, namely,

(1) The Captain of Police in Charge of Police District No. 1; and

(2) The Captain of Police in charge of rural Oahu Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4.

b. There will be a lieutenant of Police in charge of each Police District No. 2, 3, and 4; and to assist these lieutenants of Police will be three (3) Sergeants of Police for each Police Beat.

c. The personnel required within Police Districts will be supplied from the following sources:

(1) *DISTRICT NO. 1*—Police officers on pension, the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Public Utilities, Pineapple Companies, and other citizens of the City of Honolulu.

(2) *DISTRICT NO. 2*

Beat 1: Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (Inclusive). Wai'alu Agricultural Co., Ltd. Mr. John Midkiff.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—79 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

[60] (c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (Inclusive). Three Pineapple Plantations:

(a) California Packing Corporation

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(2) One (1) truck (riot).

(b) Hawaiian Pineapple Company.

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(c) Libby, McNeill & Libby.

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—32 men.

(2) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(3) *DISTRICT NO. 3*

Beat 1: Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (Inclusive). Honolulu Plantation Company—Mr. Stafford Austin.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—58 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road. Oahu Sugar Company—Mr. Hans L'Orange.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—66 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.

Beat 3: Kunia Road to Nanakuli (Inclusive). Ewa Plantation—Mr. Douglas Bond.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—63 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks for shift changes.

Beat 4: Nanakuli to Kaena Point (Inclusive). Waianae Plantation—Mr. Robert Fricke.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—112 men.

[61] (b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(4) *DISTRICT NO. 4*

Beat 1: Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road, Waimanalo Plantation—Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—40 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 2: Kokokahi Road to Kahana Bridge. (Not inclusive). Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—30 men.

(b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

Beat 3: Kahana Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive). Kahuku Plantation—Mr. J. W. Orrick.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—102 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.

d. Each police district commander will be responsible for the guarding and protecting of all vital installations, both civil and military, and within his respective district.

e. Training.

(1) Guards will be selected, after their records have been carefully scrutinized, from lists supplied by organizations detailed to do so in the Provisional Police Plan. Information as to details of training will be published in a separate Police Memorandum.

f. Divisional strength:

District Patrols & Guards	Shift	Total
I. Channel Street to Awa Street (Patrol).....	8	24
Awa St. to Pier 37, via RR (Patrol).....	6	18
Main Plant, Hawaiian Electric.....	2	6
Mutual Telephone:		
Main Plant.....	2	6
Kaimuki.....	1	3
Wailupe.....	1	3
Nuuanu.....	1	3
Kalihi.....	1	3
Punahou.....	1	3
5 Railroad Bridges, Kalihi.....	5	15
Sewer Disposal, Nuuanu Plant.....	2	6
Sewer Disposal, Date St.....	1	3
Sewer Disposal, Ala Moana & Fort Armstrong.....	1	3
[62]		
Water Supply, Beretania St.....	2	6
Water Supply, Houghtailing & King.....	2	6
Water Supply, Kapahulu & Harding.....	2	6
Water Shaft, Kamehameha IV Road.....	2	6
Water Shaft, 16th & Claudine Aves. (Kaimuki).....	2	6
2 Radio Stations.....	4	12
Headquarters' Clerks & Timekeepers.....	46	138
	1	3
Fire and Police Alarm (City Hall).....	47	141
	1	3
	48	144

g. Prior to the date that this plan is to be effective, the Army will furnish the Police Department with a detailed map of installations that are to be guarded.

4. a. Campsites—Locations of:

- (1) Police District No. 2:
 - Wahiawa—CCC Camp
 - Waialua—Waialua Agricultural Co.
- (2) Police District No. 3:
 - Aiea—Honolulu Plantation Co.
 - Waipahu—Oahu Sugar Co.
 - Ewa—Ewa Plantation Co.
 - Waianae—Army Military Reservation.
- (3) Police District No. 4:
 - Kaneohe (to be erected)
 - Kahuku—Kahuku Plantation Co.
 - Waimanalo—Waimanalo Sugar Co.

b. All sugar plantation managers, excepting Waianae Company, which is not supplying housing, have agreed to provide the messing and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations.

c. One (1) riot truck, equipped with armor plate or sandbags and armed with machine gun and sufficient personnel, will be located at every police district headquarters. One (1) pick-up truck will be located at each police beat headquarters. (Until proper arrangements can be made, the sugar plantations will furnish the above named trucks.)

d. The tour of duty on each installation by the various guards, pay, etc., will be published in a later Police Bulletin. The same will be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of this plan.

e. There will be designated a Lieutenant of Police as Supply Officer, who will be in charge of all supplies for all police districts. He will function directly under the Chief of Police.

f. All guards will be furnished with distinctive markings, insignias, uniform, etc., which will readily designate them as special police guards. (Suggested uniform for these guards would be the Army fatigue clothing, plus fabricated sun helmet of proper design).

g. Arms (service riot guns), ammunitions and equipment, sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties will be furnished by the U. S. Army.

5. a. Each riot truck, patrol car, and sub-district headquarters will be equipped with radio. (It is recommended that [63] the Territory of Hawaii extend the use of its voting booths for headquarters in the several sub-police districts.)

b. Command Posts:

- Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Station.
- Captain of Police-in-charge Division, Honolulu Police Station.
- Captain of Police, District 1, Honolulu Police Station.
- Captain of Police, Districts 2, 3, 4, at Wahiawa.
- Lieutenant of Police, District 4, at Kaneohe.
- Lieutenant of Police, District 2, at Wahiawa.
- Lieutenant of Police, District 3, at Pearl City.

W. A. GABRIELSON,
Chief of Police,
City and County of Honolulu.

1 Enclosure: Chart—Organization, Voluntary Guard Division,

Distribution:

- Commanding General, Hawaiian Division—1.
- Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade—1.
- Chief of Police—1.
- Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department—1.
- Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division—1.

District, Beat Description	Huts	Stations	R. R. Bridges	Hiway Bridges	Trucks	Beat	Men Required		
							Patrols & hqrs.	Res.	Total
IV. 1. Makapuu Point to Kokoahi Road (inclusive).....	4	1	0	0	1	33	3	4	40
2. Kokoahi Road to Kahana Bay Bridge (not inclusive).....	1	1	0	1	1	21	6	3	30
3. Kahana Bay Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive).....	4	2	15	11	2	90	3	9	102
III. 1. Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (inc).....	2	0	3	2	1	45	3	4	58
2. Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road.....	1	0	4	1	2	54	6	6	66
3. Kunia Road to Nanakuli (inc).....	3	2	3	0	2	54	3	6	63
4. Nanakuli to Kaena Point (inc).....	7	3	6	0	1	99	3	10	112
II. 1. Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (inclusive).....	3	1	5	2	1	69	3	7	79
2. Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (inclusive).....	5	0	8	3	3	123	6	13	142

RECAPITULATIONS

District I.....	144
District II.....	221
District III.....	299
District IV.....	172
Grand Total.....	836

¹ Waiuu Power Plant, 6.

[65]

EXHIBIT "K"

Confidential

POLICE DEPARTMENT,

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,

Territory of Hawaii, December 17, 1940.

Subject: Suggested Exercise for Plantations.

To: All Plantation Managers and Mr. Leo Rodby.

The Army authorities very kindly asked me as your representative to sit in on their Headquarters Staff exercises to cover war conditions.

In these exercises, only the staffs of the various units work, being told that theoretically they have so many men and such and such equipment under their control. Each officer affected is given a bunch of sealed envelopes with instructions to open them up at the different specific times stated on each envelope. Inside these sealed envelopes are messages stating that such and such an event has taken place; the officer then has to state in writing whom he contacted and what action he would take with the theoretical force at his command to handle the situation.

During these exercises, Colonel Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the Plantation Managers and civic authorities.

Colonel Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the Plantation Managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regards to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Colonel Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all the Plantations, the Plantation Managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief and possibly myself, acting as neutral judges.

Would you please let me know what you think of the above plan, and if you wish me to go further into the matter with the Army and Police authorities.

Please keep this confidential until a final decision is made on the matter.

/s/ T. G. S. Walker,

T. G. S. WALKER,

Co-ordinator, Provisional Police Plans.

TGSW: DL

[66]

EXHIBIT "L"

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 May 1941.

Subject: Participation of Provisional Police Guards in Department Maneuvers during period 17 May to 18 May 1941.

To: Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. In connection with Department Maneuvers to be held in May, five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard will participate during the period 12:00 noon, 17 May to 12:00 noon, 18 May 1941, inclusive. The contemplated plan calls for the employment of one hundred ninety-four (194) of those men for each relief while guarding installations located within Police Districts II, III and IV.

2. It is desired you designate nine (9) officers (junior grade) and nine (9) non-commissioned officers to supervise and instruct these guards in the use of the Riot Shot Gun, and nine (9) Medical Corps enlisted men who are capable of administering first aid. This personnel to report to the office of the Department Provost Marshal at 10:00 am, 10 May 1941. It is further desired that a total of 235 Riot Shot Guns and a total of 2,910 rounds (5 rounds per man) of ammunition for same be made available for target practice, and a total of 235 targets—E. Silhouette type.

3. The personnel mentioned above will be stationed as indicated and the Riot Shot Guns and ammunition for same distributed as shown below:

Police District II

Beat 1:

Place: Haleiwa Court House
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 Em to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 31

Beat 2:

Place: Wahiawa Court House
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 31

Police District III

Beat 1:

Place: Pearl City Court House
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 19 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 19

Beat 2:

Place: Waipahu Athletic Field
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 24

[67] Beat 3:

Place: Administration Building, Ewa
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 24

Beat 4:

Place: Wainae Courthouse
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 24

Police District IV

Beat 1:

Place: Waimanalo Plantation Gymnasium
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 14 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 14

Beat 2:

Place: Kaneohe Court House
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 11 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 11

Beat 3:

Place: Kahuku Plantation Co. Police Station (near Picture House)
 Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
 NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
 1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
 Guns: 37 Riot Shot Guns
 Targets: 37

Totals

Commissioned Officers.....	9
Non-Commissioned Officers.....	9
Enlisted Men capable of administering 1st Aid.....	9
Riot Shot Guns.....	235
Rounds of Ammunition for Riot Shot Guns.....	2910
Targets.....	235

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

[68]

EXHIBIT "M"

Subject: Objectives of the Diversified Crop Committee of H. S. P. A.

1. Basic Considerations.

a. The purpose of crop diversification should be dual, namely, to make the local community more self-sufficient in time of peace and to develop local facilities so that Oahu may be made entirely self-supporting in time of war.

b. A broadened agricultural base to include a greater diversification of food crops will be of great value in a depression, will be an influence to improve the well-being of local labor at all times and may well be the determining influence in the defense of these islands in time of war. The cost of the development of diversified agriculture may be considered as a very reasonable insurance premium protecting an investment of many millions.

c. The local climate and other conditions make it economically sound to put the major agricultural effort of the islands into sugar and pineapple production. The major emphasis on these two products should not be altered.

d. Present trade relations with the West coast in food commodities provide a valuable mainland tie which should not be severed.

e. A reasonable objective should be to accomplish a 50% self-sufficiency in time of peace accomplished by putting major emphasis on those things which are most suited to local production.

f. Crop diversification in the Hawaiian Islands, to be effective must be within the plantation system. This is apparent in view of the fact that plantations control all suitable land, control most of the labor and are financially the only agencies capable of undertaking any such activity.

g. Crop diversification should be given "infant industry" assistance and protection. This is necessary in view of the fact that the local agricultural field is completely occupied.

h. Diversified agriculture should be developed under conditions such that a relatively small amount of land in the most suitable location will be devoted to it. This will require land in an area outside the heavy rain belt and where irrigation is easily feasible.

i. Food production must be so organized as to provide for a continuous flow of produce to the market. Retailers will patronize the agency which can promise continuity of supply. This will require control by the plantations, the H. S. P. A. or a growers associations such as the Maui Association.

/s/ J. A. ULIO.

[69]

EXHIBIT "N"

EXPERIMENT STATION OF THE HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION

APPENDIX SEC. III-B-(1)

JUNE 19, 1941.

The Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii, Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR POINDEXTER: In compliance with your request, I submit the following brief statement regarding what has been done and what should be done to insure an adequate food supply for Hawaii in case of an emergency.

The Diversified Crops Committee.

In 1935, the H. S. P. A. called together, as a Diversified Crops Committee, a group of men representing all phases of agricultural endeavor in the Territory.

Ever since its inauguration, this Committee has functioned continuously and at the present time its membership is as follows:

J. H. Beaumont
H. P. Agee
F. W. Broadbent
D. L. Drawford
A. L. Dean
A. D. Ednie

Col. Casey Hayes
L. D. Larsen
H. L. Lyon
W. W. G. Moir
H. H. Warner
Neil Webster

While the primary function of the Diversified Crops Committee was to find new crops that could be grown in the Territory with profit to the growers, it has from the very first given much attention to plans for producing, locally, crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence in case some emergency stopped the flow into the Territory of foodstuffs from outside sources. During the past year, all the efforts of this Committee have been focussed on this one objective.

A Food Administration with Authority an Obvious Necessity

The Diversified Crops Committee has at all times held the opinion that whenever an emergency develops necessitating the local production of a large part or all of the food required to feed the people in this Territory, a Food Administration would be set up and financed by the Federal Government, and given unlimited powers to requisition land, water, labor, machinery, fuel and all seeds and cuttings of food plants.

The Diversified Crops Committee has, through long continued efforts on the part of its members and their associates, worked up feasible plans for food and feed production in this Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a Food Administration if, and when, such [70] an Administration was created.

On request, the Diversified Crops Committee can supply inventories of stocks of essential foods, feeds, fuels, etc. present at the time in the Territory and can also provide an estimate of the cost of any operation which it recommends.

If Prepared for the Worst, any lesser Emergency can be Easily Handled.

It is quite probable that if an emergency develops, the Territory will experience a gradual curtailment of transportation facilities but we should be prepared to promptly meet the worst possible situation. As the bulk of the Territory's population resides on the Island of Oahu, the most serious situation that can arise is the complete isolation of Oahu, not only from the mainland but from the other Islands in the group as well. The Diversified Crops Committee has prepared a food production plan to meet this critical situation should it ever arise. If some agency is authorized and financed to carry out this plan to meet the worst possible situation, it will be able to cope rather easily with any situation of lesser severity which may be inflicted upon us. The Diversified Crops Committee has, therefore, drawn up a Basic Plan to meet the extreme situation; this plan being so drawn that it can be put into effect by increments, the entire plan becoming effective only when the extreme situation is about to be realized.

Adequate Funds should be made Immediately Available.

If the extreme situation develops—that is, complete isolation of Oahu—the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waianae, Kahuku and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations. The lands of these plantations are among the most highly productive in the Territory and their use for growing diversified crops will represent a heavy financial investment. The minimum area of irrigated lands required for planting under the Basic Plan is 8,700 acres. These sugar cane lands, when requisitioned, will all be carrying heavy crops of cane and it will require much energy, labor and expense to get this cane out of the ground, put the land in shape and plant other crops. Seeds and propagating material for the crops to be planted must be grown or purchased.

Seeds for some crops can be purchased from outside sources but that for others, such as pigeon pea, must be grown locally. The sweet potato should be our most extensively planted food crop as it is our most reliable, but we shall have to have much more propagating material than is now available in the

Territory. Steps should be taken at once to secure appropriate land and grow thereon the propagating material of the essential crops which will be required for the initial plantings under the Basic Plan.

The planting, cultivating and harvesting of the food crops that must be grown will require special machinery not now to be found on sugar plantations or elsewhere in the Territory. The procuring of this machinery should be attended to at once as it will take time to get it here from the mainland. Following recommendations of the Diversified Crops Committee, the H. S. P. A. has already invested several thousand dollars in [71] emergency machinery, but this will only serve to demonstrate what is needed. The H. S. P. A. has also spent many thousands of dollars on the promotion of diversified crops through field and feeding experiments carried on under the supervision of the Diversified Crops Committee.

We Must Grow Crops for Feed.

In addition to growing food crops for human consumption, we must grow crops to feed beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs and and poultry, for we must have meat, milk and eggs. The by-products of the sugar and pineapple industries will be employed to advantage as feed, but these will not go very far towards fulfilling requirements. We must grow forage crops for cattle, root crops for hogs and seed crops for poultry.

Protein Foods and Feeds.

A life sustaining diet for all animals including man must provide a considerable amount of protein, that is, organic compounds containing nitrogen. Hawaii's standard crops are notoriously rich in carbohydrates but very low in protein. As a consequence, the Territory imports, under normal conditions, large amounts of foods and feeds which supply protein. To provide adequate protein for human consumption and for stock feed will be one of the most serious problems to be solved in an extreme emergency.

All plants can make protein out of carbohydrates and inorganic nitrogen, but animals do not possess this ability, so must derive all their proteins from plants. The sugar cane, pineapple and banana make protein for their own bodies, but place very little of it in the products which we recover, so, in an emergency, we must grow plants that put protein in that portion of their bodies which we, as humans, use for food. Bean plants deposit a lot of protein in their seeds and, as we can grow many varieties of beans successfully in Hawaii, they constitute one crop on which we can rely for a considerable part of our protein in an emergency.

Another crop rich in protein, the cultivation of which is being advocated by the Diversified Crops Committee, is yeast. This lowly organism can be grown easily in a weak sugar solution to which has been added ordinary fertilizer salts. It feeds on the sugar and, picking up the nitrogen and mineral elements, builds up protein, growing at a prodigious rate. The yeast organism does not construct a complicated body but merely clothes its living substance with a thin membrane. A mass of dry yeast, therefore, is largely protein. Under favorable conditions, which are easily maintained in any climate, a crop of yeast grows to maturity in less than 24 hours, so it is quite possible to harvest a crop every day in the year.

At a pilot plant in Honolulu, financed by the H. S. P. A., all the details of yeast production as a commercial crop has been worked out. The dry product is 50 per cent protein and very rich in the vitamins of the "B" complex. It is quite palatable and a number of people have, for some time, been eating it regularly to determine its value as a source of protein in the human diet. Their reactions are all very favorable. Up to the present time, most of the output of this pilot plant has been used in feeding experiments at the University with cattle, hogs and poultry. The results of these experiments clearly indicate that yeast is an excellent source of protein for these food-yielding animals. However, since this yeast has proven to be a good protein food for humans, it would be poor economy to feed it to beef cattle in an emergency, for it will [72] be necessary to feed at least 10 pounds of yeast protein for every pound of protein recovered in beef.

Since an abundance of sugar will always be available on Oahu, the Diversified Crops Committee recommends that adequate facilities be provided so that in an emergency yeast may be produced in large quantities for food and feed. Under our conditions, the culture of yeast affords the surest and quickest method of producing the essential protein.

Stores and Storage Most Essential.

It will be at least 6 months after operations under the Basic Plan have been started before its returns will fully meet the needs of the population, so it is essential that we have on hand supplies of food and feed to carry us through this critical period.

We have learned by experience that crops cannot be successfully grown on our lands unless they are supplied with adequate fertilizers and as all fertilizers used in Hawaii are brought in from outside sources, it is essential that an adequate supply of these materials be imported and held in reserve for use in case an emergency develops.

In order to combat the diseases and insect pests which are certain to attack the divers crops which we must grow in an emergency, we should have on hand an adequate supply of appropriate insecticides and fungicides. These materials should be brought into the Territory while transportation facilities are still available.

Most of the energy consumed in the Territory outside of sugar factories is derived from fuel oil, diesel oil and gasoline brought from the mainland. We cannot have electric lights and electric power if the flow of these fuels from the mainland is stopped. Most of the water used for domestic purposes and irrigation on Oahu is pumped from wells with power derived from fuel oil. Deprive Oahu of fuel oil, and the water supply of Honolulu would fail completely, while most of the can fields on the Island would have to go without water and the crops which they carry would be ruined. Deprive Oahu of Diesel oil and gasoline and it would be impossible to operate the machinery necessary to the cultivation of field crops. It is most essential, therefore, that if an extreme emergency is impending, large supplies of fuel oil, Diesel oil and gasoline be held in storage on Oahu for, if our power supply fails, we will be unable to long survive.

Cultivation of Truck Crops in Hawaii Not Profitable under Normal Conditions

The chief aim of agriculture is to capture radiant energy by means of crops which store it in products which can be utilized by man. Of all known crops, sugar cane is the most efficient producer of such products and, consequently, its cultivation adds more to our national resources in a given time than can the cultivation of any other crop. So long as normal transportation between Hawaii and the mainland can be maintained, Hawaii can contribute most to our national resources by growing sugar for shipment to the mainland, and most to our national prosperity by buying from the mainland products produced more efficiently there than they can be produced in Hawaii.

[73] Hawaii is tropical and its fields are not suitable to the cultivation of temperate zone crops. If such crops are grown, the yields are not comparable to those obtained in temperate climes.

It should be obvious to any student making a careful examination of the situation that anyone undertaking the production of truck crops in Hawaii on a scale sufficient to satisfy the local demand for these crops is embarking on a course that will lead to financial disaster if mainland produce has continued access to our market. If Hawaii must undertake the production of food crops to tide her through a national emergency, the Federal Government should underwrite the enterprise, as it cannot survive when the emergency is passed and will be liquidated at a considerable loss to its promoters.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) HAROLD L. LYON, *Director.*

[74]

EXHIBIT "O"

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 15, 1941.

Major General BRIANT H. WELLS (Ret.)
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,

Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL WELLS: Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the "Field Operations Committee", and for the "Emergency Planting Plan" of the Diversified Crops Committee.

I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute a basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

In this connection, I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[75]

EXHIBIT "P"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL,
October 3rd, 1941.

To All District Chairmen

GENTLEMEN: For information and guidance, I am enclosing herewith the Outline of Organization as used by Mr. Penhallow of District "8". The functions under such sub-committee may be changed to suit local conditions in each district. Further information regarding the function of each committee, will be found in the "Outline of Plan for Protective Measures for Civilian Population of Oahu in case of Bombardment," recently delivered to you.

We have also received a letter from Dr. R. B. Faus, In Charge of Detail Plans and Training, which we give you herewith:—

"At the request of Mr. Walker, I am pleased to inform you that one unit of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service has been formed at Kailua under the direction of Dr. Chinn. I know one is being formed at Kaneohe under the direction of Dr. Ching and a third at Wahiawa under Dr. Mack.

"First Aid classes have been conducted at Kahuku and Waiaina under Drs. Rothwell and Davis. (Classes have been and are being held at Aiea under Dr. Thompson). Dr. Garton Wall informs me that he is all set at Ewa Plantation. I have not been informed as to what further assistance they may need in the way of equipment and man-power to develop their units."

From the foregoing, it is evident that any information and assistance needed for the formation of Medical units in the various districts, will be gladly given by Dr. Faus and his committee. Please address all communications to Dr. Faus thru these headquarters.

Yours truly,

/s/ S. L. Austin
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee,
Major Disaster Council.

SLA:FSB
Encl.

[76]

Major Disaster Committee—District 8

Chairman: Richard Penhallow
Vice Chairman: Robert Johnston
Transportation: Alfred Muller
Police: George W. Groves
Medical: P. H. Liljestrand
Fire: T. B. Goskirk
Communication: Intelligence, S. K. Toomey
Food Administration: Jaul I. Fagan, Jr.
Electric Power-Light: Syl. Sonognini

Transportation-Evacuation: A Muller

List of available transportation (less Police, Fire, Medical and communication requirements)

Organization chart for transportation personnel, motor & R. R.

Maintenance of equipment

Co-operation—Police, Medical, Fire, Communication, Food Administration and Electric committees.

Police: G. W. Groves

Provisional Police and company guards

Protection of Transportation Routes

Utility installations

Prevention of Looting

Direction of Traffic

Maintenance of order in time of disaster

Instruction in behavior when alarm sounds (Schools, etc.)

Training of Police personnel

Black-out committee (J. K. Evans)

Education of Public

Co-operation—All other committees.

Medical: P. H. Liljestrand

Outline of plan to supply medical aid during time of disaster:

Location of Hospital and Aid Stations

Location of Collecting points

Organization of Personnel

Training of Personnel

Education of Public

Maintenance of Public Health, Prevention of Epidemic:

Immunization

Sanitation

Co-operation—All other committees.

Fire: T. B. Goskirk

Organization of Fire brigades

Maintenance of equipment

Training of Personnel

Education of Public, Incendiary bombs, etc.

Co-operation—All other committees.

Communication and Intelligence: S. K. Toomey

District Headquarters:

Communication Liaison between Rural Headquarters and district organization

Communication Liaison between units of district organization and between units and headquarters

Organization chart of personnel including messengers and radio and telephone personnel (2 Radio Patrol Cars).

[77] Intelligence:

Keep in constant touch with the grape vine, to learn in advance of subversive activity to enable Police to maintain order. (Camp Police personnel)

Co-operation—All other committees.

Food Administration: P. I. Fagan, Jr.

Company food production. (Prepared plan)

Home gardens. (Educational campaign)

Store inventories. (Maintain periodical check)

Household inventories. (Encourage increase)

Make an outline of your organization's arm's and personnel

Co-operation—All other committees.

Electric Power and Light: Syl. Sonogūini

Organization chart of maintenance Crews

Maintain Plantation electric system by repairing breaks as soon as they occur

Co-operation—All other committees.

Rural Water: A. M. DaVico

Organization Chart of Maintenance & Repair Crews

Description of System

Outline of Alternate sources in case of destruction or obstruction of present system

Plan for transporting drinking water if impossible to pipe
 Cooperation with Rural Water Department, City & County
 Cooperation with all other committees.

Engineering: J. M. Nakano

Organization Chart of administrative personnel & necessary crews for
 damage repair

Plan for air raid protection by clocks in villages:

Suitable plans for Air Raid Shelters

Recommendation for location of Air Raid Shelters

Cooperation with Engineer, Rural Chairman's Advisory Staff

Cooperation with all other committees.

[78]

EXHIBIT "Q"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
 CIVILIAN DEFENSE CORPS,
 December 21st, 1941.

Mr. T. G. S. WALKER,

Director, Civilian Defense Council, Honolulu, Hawaii.

DEAR SIR: With reference to your memorandum of December 30th, 1941, on the subject of Civilian Defense, I give you the following. I am enclosing herewith the Organization Chart of the Rural Oahu Committee of the Civilian Defense Council, so that you may get a clear picture of the set-up in Rural Oahu.

Within an hour of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Forces of the Rising Sun, this whole rural organization was functioning 100% in all capacities. The various committees were standing by at their designated Stations for immediate action.

From then on everything moved along smoothly and the civilian activities were taken care of in all the districts without delay. All vital public utilities installations were placed under guard and plantation power plants were standing by to come onto the main lines at the moment's notice of a power failure.

In the weeks following the "Blitz", all defense requirements of labor, equipment and supplies for both the Army and Navy were handled through this office for the Rural Districts, which turned out to be a tremendous job. However, we believe that the wants of the Army and Navy were well taken care of. In fact, all labor, equipment and supplies were pooled for their immediate use. One special article of which they were in dire need, was sand bags and their wants in this line were quickly made available to them from the stocks of sugar bags on hand at the plantations. Approximately 1,000,000 bags were requisitioned for this purpose.

All food inventories were taken care of with dispatch by the Committee of Food Administration which was ably handled by the Chairman, Mr. W. W. Morrell. This licensing of stores was also done by the same group of men in the Rural Areas.

Our Rural Engineering Committee is busy at this time, gathering all information on utilities in the Rural Districts to make it available to the U. S. E. D. Department of Utilities, who has asked that this be done by our Rural Civilian Defense Committee.

The rationing of gasoline in the Rural Districts is being well taken care of by the nine district chairmen. This is a big job in itself and the chairmen are to be congratulated on the fine manner in which they handled all the various and sundry items that were asked of them to do. All this work being done on their own time and everyone has given freely of their time.

[79] We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the fine work done by your office and the excellent and efficient manner in which all our problems were handled by your organization. I do believe that the Oahu Defense Organization really put their hearts into the job at hand, and made it go with a minimum of delay. The chairman of the Rural Committees did a swell job and as Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee, I have nothing but praises for the fine work these gentlemen have done and are still doing.


Sincerely,

/s/ Stafford L. Austin,
 STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,

Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee, Civilian Defense Corps.

- EXHIBIT - R -

CHART COMPARING SUGAR CANE ACREAGE, SUGAR PRODUCTION, AVERAGE NUMBER OF MALE ADULT EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED) AND TOTAL MEN-DAYS ALL EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED) ON HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTATIONS.



[81]

EXHIBIT "S"

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Washington, November 2, 1945.HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: I regret very much that previous commitments have made it impossible for me to accept the kind invitation extended by your President, Mr. P. E. Spalding, to attend the 50th Anniversary dinner of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

Please extend my congratulations to the officials of your association's experimental station in their observance of its 50th year of operation. Your association has earned recognition as a research organization through the persistent efforts of its scientific personnel. It is only necessary to compare the per-acre production of sugar cane in your area with the similar results of any area in the world to realize the outstanding scientific progress made by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful.

The scientific knowledge your association has acquired through the years provides the best kind of basis for further important research. Knowledge is one thing which can never be surplus. In building the kind of free world for which we have fought, we shall have use for all the knowledge we possess and can acquire. One way or another, we must build a world of plenty for all people. That is the only way the world can survive. Let us work together, using all available knowledge, to expand the world's economy and meet the needs of mankind.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CLINTON P. ANDERSON, *Secretary.*[82] CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJOR
DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

T. G. S. Walker, Honolulu, Hawaii

[83] Probably no community in the United States has been more closely geared to the activities of the Army and Navy throughout its entire history than has the community of the Territory of Hawaii and more particularly the Island of Oahu and the City and County of Honolulu.

It is believed that the Territory of Hawaii was among the very first, if not the first, integral part of the United States of America, to realize that war with Japan was becoming inevitable and that the civilian population would not only be vitally affected by the war but should organize to take care of as many of the civilian public as possible without calling on the military authorities and Army troops for help.

BLACKOUT PRACTICES

As early as 1939, the City and County government of Honolulu, with the cooperation of Army authorities, organized and carried out a comprehensive total blackout for the Island of Oahu. The cooperation of the public was outstanding and the mechanics of blacking out for the island in case of a sudden attack proven satisfactory. Similar blackout practices territorial-wide were carried out in 1940 and 1941 with equally favorable response from Army authorities. A copy of the radio statement of General Short following the blackout test of Hawaii on May 20, 1941, is attached herewith in full as Exhibit "A".

ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMITTEE

In July 1940, one of the Supervisors of the Board of Supervisors, City and County of Honolulu, Mr. A. S. Cleghorn Robertson, had proposed the formation of a committee to prepare a major emergency disaster plan and to draft a bill to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors. At a meeting of a general committee of businessmen and leaders of the community held at the Mayor's office on July 8, 1940, a motion had been made by Mr. Cain which was duly passed reading in part "to determine how much money, if any, would be needed and how much work would be involved in the establishment of such a committee."

By letter dated July 16, 1940, Mayor Crane, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, appointed a subcommittee with instructions "to study more fully the Emergency Disaster Plan." This subcommittee, at this early date of July, 1940, proceeded to consider a broad Emergency Disaster Plan contemplating "sabotage during the period of strained relations; war with its attendant possibilities of partial blockade; blockade; bombardment; bombing, landing parachute troops; landing of major boats or troops." The agenda states that by "strained relations", the subcommittee envisaged conditions to exist in which it seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage and preparations for an attack on this Territory and that during such a period government of the city would be conducted as in normal times up until the time [84] That the Governor declared martial law. At such time the subcommittee envisaged that the Governor would take charge of the administration with the aid of the National Guard and the Emergency Disaster Plan could therefore provide for the cooperation of our citizenship with the Governor and the National Guard. At the discretion of the Governor, assistance of Federal troops, Army and Navy, could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should be foreseen and provided for. The agenda also conceived the possibilities that upon the inception of war the government of the Territory would presumably be taken over by the military authorities. Therefore, any proposed emergency disaster plan could provide for cooperating with the military force "so that as little burden as possible falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary in the field."

Following this expression of community interest in preparedness activities, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Oahu Plantation Managers Association had initiated at their own expense the training of a Provisional Guard Unit at their own expense. This development is discussed in the statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

On April 3, 1941, Mayor Lester Petrie who succeeded Charles S. Crane as Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu called a meeting of the Board of Supervisors with various department heads to "consider the formulation of and participation by the City and County government in a major disaster plan for this community." The undersigned, as Coordinator for the Plantation Provisional Police Unit was present at this meeting. Mayor Petrie explained that "the object is really to coordinate our plans and schedules with the military service so that in the time of extreme emergency, the military service will not be hampered unnecessarily by civilian problems which we can well take care of ourselves." He explained that he had discussed these proposals with General Herron and with General Short. General Short was then expected to discuss these civilian activities at the Army Day luncheon, which he did on April 7, 1941.

At this time, also, the Honolulu Medical Society was proceeding with its organization of an Emergency Preparedness Committee. At the meeting of the Mayor, Dr. Clarence E. Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman of the Medical Preparedness Committee pointed out that the Committee was then working on some twelve aid stations possibly increasing that to twenty to be located throughout the city, operating on a twenty-four hour basis in time of emergency. Different concerns in town had already volunteered about one hundred commercial trucks for ambulances. About sixty drivers had volunteered for training and a first aid unit was being set up for display and training.

The Chief of Police explained that at that time a force of between 2,000 and 2,500 men had been organized to guard public utility companies, plantations, both sugar and pineapple, the City and County, the oil companies, and other installations. This plan contemplated complete tie-up with the Army and the civilian police.

The Mayor explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss organizational activities possible on the part of the City and County of Honolulu in view of the existing defense activities being carried forward by individual groups and organizations and the discussions in the Territorial Legislature. [85] As a result of this meeting a temporary committee of five was appointed by the Mayor which in turn called upon the undersigned to assist in studying emergency disaster plans. This committee recommended to the Mayor the appointment of a Major Disaster Council composed of City and County department heads with certain representatives of the utility companies. Appointment of a full-time Coordinator was also recommended, and a proposed resolution was submitted urging the Territorial Legislature to allocate sufficient funds for a major emergency. Representatives of the Army, Navy and Territorial Government were to be appointed to the Council.

In the meantime, on April 8, 1941, an ordinance was proposed before the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, to create a Major Disaster Council. This ordinance was approved on April 26, 1941. The Major Disaster Council so created was to consist of the Mayor, a City and County department head as Vice-Chairman, and such other persons as the Mayor might appoint with the approval of the Board of Supervisors. This Council was charged with the coordination of all community resources and by means of mutual cooperation and effort to create a plan for utilizing all resources for relief and general welfare of the people in the event of some major disaster. The Mayor was empowered to declare when an emergency disaster existed. The divisions of the Council were set forth to include, among others, transportation, communications, power and light, law and order, fire protection, water and water supply, medical, Red Cross, rescue demolition and gas protection, air raid warning, mortuary work, finance and supplies, and rural Oahu. The Ordinance authorized a coordinator to be responsible for the entire plan.

The Mayor proceeded, therefore, with the appointment of the Council and the undersigned Coordinator. The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council was held on June 24, 1941. Copy of the Minutes of this first meeting is attached herewith as Exhibit "B." Also attached as part of the same exhibit is an organizational chart of the Council as originally established.

Close coordination was maintained with the Army through the designation by General Short of Lt. Colonel Casey Hayes, F. A., U. S. Army, of G-5 Section, Hawaiian Department, and Col. H. K. B. Lyman, CE, U. S. A., Department Engineer, as advisors of the Council. Capt. C. C. Baughman, USN, Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, was designated by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Navy Advisor. By October, 1941, the Department Surgeon, Colonel Edgar King, USA, had been designated an advisor.

The undersigned as Coordinator, with the Executive Committee of the Council, proceeded to set up suitable headquarters, organized and trained volunteers, tabulated available transportation and evacuation facilities, designated emergency reporting points for all personnel equipment, and took all other possible steps to cushion the shock to civilians in any emergency that might arise. The necessity for relief of trained Army personnel for actual combat by having civilians handle as many of their own problems as possible was a paramount consideration in all of the above plans and activities.

The provisional police organization as developed subsequent to June, 1940, was merged with the Major Disaster Council. All plantation managers and other chairman of the various districts were appointed Major Disaster Council chairmen with the fullest possible power to act for the Council in their own districts in case of an attack.

[86] On July 1, 1941, the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Committee of the Honolulu Medical Society which had been training volunteers several months with funds supplied by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and some considerable assistance from the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, was made a Major Disaster Committee with Dr. H. L. Arnold as Chairman and Dr. Robert Faus as Vice Chairman. The Mayor and Board of Supervisors allocated \$6,000 to cover this Committee's expenses for the period from July 1-December 31, 1941. The above sum was augmented by \$5,000 from proceeds of a benefit football game. A full report of the activities and medical preparedness by Dr. H. L. Arnold is set forth hereafter. Private individuals, the Chamber of Commerce, and Committee Members themselves made contributions to the activities of the Major Disaster Council. The contributions were

not limited to any racial group but included all nationalities—Caucasian, Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese.

The Coordinator for the Major Disaster Council from the time of appointment to December 7, 1941, delivered approximately 150 talks to business and fraternal organizations, parent-teachers association groups, etc., emphasizing the need for preparedness and the need for volunteers. The response of the community to these talks, and the response of the publicity given to the activities of the Major Disaster Council in the formulation and preparation of plans was considerable.

Mayor Lester Petrie and the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu approved the purchase on City and County funds of medical equipment totalling \$50,000; medical supplies \$10,000; fire fighting equipment worth \$72,500 and two-way radio equipment \$7,500. Most of this equipment arrived in November, 1941, and was of inestimable value on December 7, 1941. In the purchase of fire equipment, able assistance provided by Mr. Charles W. Schruth, Federal Works Engineer, was of great value in permitting procurement through the Lanham Act. This equipment started arriving in Honolulu in February, 1942. Close liaison was maintained with Army and Navy Intelligence as well as with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In its coordinating activities, the Major Disaster Council joined with Army, Navy and FBI representatives in establishing a committee with prominent representatives of each racial group resident in Hawaii for the purposes of formulating plans for meeting the problems attendant upon any war emergency with the variety of racial groups present in the Territory.

In conjunction with the Army authorities and parallel with the public appeal of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding general, Hawaiian Department, a campaign was initiated to get householders to purchase canned goods for storage up to the limit of their cupboard space. In this manner large spaces in warehouses and store shelves were cleared permitting merchants to make large purchases in shipments from the Coast in October and November, 1941. The amount of shipping space thus released for war materials was appreciable.

COÖPERATION WITH TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS—M-DAY LAW

During this period it was becoming more and more apparent that the situation called for wider authority and more financial backing than that possible under City and County financing. The Major Disaster Council urged Governor Joseph Poindexter to call a special session of the Legislature to [87] enact an M-Day law, giving the Governor unusual emergency powers. This session was called by the Governor on September 15, 1941. And at the request of the Governor and President of the Territorial Senate, a special committee of the Major Disaster Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Fred Ohrt, compiled a financial report showing what "M-Day funds" in their opinion should be set aside for preparedness activities and in case of an attack. This recommendation was for \$1,500,000 the first year and a total of \$8,000,000 in case of a war of three years. Also at the request of the Territorial Senate, the Coordinator and members of the Major Disaster Council attended this session and gave advice regarding the M-Day Bill.

It was at this session that Lt. General Walter C. Short appeared at the request of the Territorial Government and gave a strong talk on the danger of the situation and the urgent needs. The Territorial Legislature passed the M-Day Bill allocating \$500,000 to this Administration and setting up a reserve fund of \$1,000,000.

The work of the City and County Major Disaster Council had undoubtedly alerted large numbers of the population to the dangers involved in the Pacific and the necessity for serious, intensive defense preparedness. It is impossible to present briefly any complete picture of the extensive preparations that were made and the training and preparations carried through. In any event, however, the rapidity with which the personnel of the Major Disaster Council organization reported for duty immediately after the attack on December 7, 1941, and proceeded to discharge their pre-assigned duties efficiently and effectively is ample proof of the excellent organization that had been developed. There is attached herewith as Exhibit "C" a copy of a summary prepared by the undersigned of the activities of the Council following the attack. This report was prepared on January 2, 1942, following the activities of that fateful time. Additional reports of the various sub-committees are available if desired.

CONCLUSION

By this summary of defense activities, the undersigned has attempted to present in summary form only the extensive preparedness activities undertaken by the civilian community prior to the war. Additional brief statements of the chairmen of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Medical Preparedness Committee, the Transportation Committee, the Blood Bank, and the Reserve Police follow this statement.

It is believed that after a review of these statements it will be evident that the civilian community had succeeded, long prior to Pearl Harbor, in developing elaborate preparations for any major disaster and demonstrated complete cooperation with the Army and the Navy with active response to any of the desires or suggestions of the military authorities for civilian preparedness. It is believed that this is certainly a matter to be entered into the record of the Honorable Investigating Committee to counteract any inferences or impressions in the testimony and report of the Pearl Harbor Army Board which might be construed to the contrary.

Additional information and material is available relative to the activities of the Major Disaster Council should the Committee so desire.

T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. WALKER.

[88]

EXHIBIT "A"

GENERAL SHORT'S BLACKOUT BROADCAST TALK, 20 MAY 1941

General SHORT (Following introduction by announcer): I am speaking to you from the command post of the Hawaiian Department somewhere on the Island of Oahu. Into this command post tonight have streamed the messages from the many vantage points both on this island of Oahu as well as from Hawaii, Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Kauai, telling the story of the great job the Territory of Hawaii has done in blacking out the Islands.

Far underground in the command post are located the vital nerve centers of command and communications of the Hawaiian Department. Staff officers have been receiving these reports both from Army airplanes and observation posts. In an actual emergency it is into these C. P.s that the story of the blackout would stream.

From a vantage point in an observation post nearby I have with my own eyes witnessed the complete blackout of Honolulu, the great Pearl Harbor naval base, Schofield Barracks, and the Army's Hickam Field.

I have watched the swift and expeditious manner in which this job was done. From the reports pouring into the command post and handed to me here, I have been apprised of the success of the exercise throughout the entire Territory.

Hawaii has had, probably, more practice in blackout than any other major American community. But she has out-done her previous efforts tonight. Loyalty and cooperation with your Territorial Blackout Committee has spelled success in a job which would have made the task of enemy bombers a difficult one.

With such a spirit activating all Americans in this time of national trial I think we can meet with confidence all threats of enemy encroachment even that of bombardment from the air.

Governor Poindexter, Mr. Sinclair and members of the Territorial Blackout Committee, and to the people of the Territory of Hawaii, I extend my praise and congratulations, and giving you my aloha, I say Good Night.

[89]

EXHIBIT "B"

MINUTES—MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu was called to order by Mayor Lester Petrie, at 1:30 P. M. on Tuesday, June 24th, 1941, in the Assembly Room of Honolulu Hale.

Mayor Petrie opened the meeting by announcing that while a Council such as this had been under consideration for some time, it was necessary to get official backing before anything of importance could be done. The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu had, therefore, on April 8th, 1941, passed Ordinance No. 891, Bill No. 24, creating the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu, outlining its duties and functions, and providing for its maintenance. Mayor Petrie explained that the work had been delayed while the "M" day bill was under consideration in the Territorial Legislature, but now that it seems advisable, the organization of the Council would proceed immediately.

The Mayor expressed his appreciation for the response given by the downtown business men to his invitation to serve on the Council, and their indication of willingness to serve on this committee.

Mayor Petrie announced that he had appointed Mr. T. G. S. Walker as Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council, and that Mr. Walker had his staff organized and was at the service of the members.

A call of the roll showed all members of the Council present or officially represented.

Mr. T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator, gave a resume of what has been done by, and what could be expected of, the co-ordinator's office. He said that the principal aim was to try and stop the overlapping of individual organizations, and to get all civilian defense workers under the authority of the Mayor and Board of Supervisors. Mr. Walker said that in the main the committees would be run by City and County executives, but that no defense plan would be complete without the cooperation of the industrial and business leaders, and for this reason the splendid response of these leaders was greatly appreciated.

The Co-ordinator announced that the policy would be that the Co-ordinator will simply be the liaison man, who will work with the Army and Navy authorities so that our efforts will coordinate with their defense plans. He stated that both the Army and the Navy had been asked to serve on the Major Disaster Council in an advisory capacity, and that General Short had delegated, as representatives of the Army, Col. A. K. B. Lyman and Col. Casey Hayes; while Admiral Block had sent as the representatives of the Navy, Captain C. C. Baughman.

Mr. Walker stressed the fact that the work of the Council would of necessity be done by the chairmen of the various committees which the Mayor would appoint later in the meeting, and by their assistants, but that his office and staff would at all times be available for information or assistance. [90] He suggested that in order to facilitate the handling of major problems, and to save the members of the Council from having to meet too frequently, an Executive Committee be appointed, and that it be comprised of the chairmen of the main committees of the Council.

Mayor Petrie said that he considered this the best procedure. He then asked the approval of the Council on the following appointments to the chairmanships of the various committees set up by Ordinance 891 :

1. Co-ordination—T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation—Addison E. Kirk
3. Communications—Alvah A. Scott
6. Law and Order—W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection—W. W. Blaisdell
9. Water and Water Supply—Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways—Joseph F. Kunesh
- 11-12. Medical: Health & Sanitation—T. M. Mossman, M. D.
- 13-14. Red Cross: Rescue etc.—John F. Gray.
20. Finance—George Waterhouse

The Mayor added that he had requested the Board of Supervisors to approve the name of W. W. Beers as a member of the Council, and that this action would be taken at the Board meeting today. Mr. Beers would then be appointed in charge of a new committee to handle the Food problem.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that the list of chairmen submitted by Mayor Petrie be approved.

Mayor Petrie then asked that each member of the Council submit in writing to the Co-ordinator, the name, address and telephone number of an alternate who could represent him in case of enforced absence from a meeting of the Council.

The Mayor then suggested that the Executive Committee be comprised of the following:

Mayor Lester Petrie, Chairman
 Joseph F. Kunesh, Vice-Chairman
 W. A. Gabrielson
 Frederik Ohrt
 W. W. Blaisdell
 T. M. Mossman, M. D.
 John F. Gray
 Alvah A. Scott
 Addison E. Kirk
 Supervisor John M. Asing
 George Waterhouse
 W. W. Beers
 Col. A. K. B. Lyman
 Col. Casey Hayes
 Captain C. C. Baughman
 T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator

The list was accepted as presented.

The suggestion was made, however, that the Council be kept advised at all times of the action taken by the Executive Committee, and this was agreed to be a necessary procedure.

The Mayor then presented for discussion the subject of finances. He pointed out that all phases of the work were handicapped by the lack of funds, and he stated that the City and County had reached its limit in supplying money to carry on the work. He then asked for suggestions as to a solution of the problem.

[91] A long discussion followed as to ways and means of financing the work of the Disaster Council.

Mr. Dillingham suggested that at least part of the cost should be borne by the Federal Government, and suggested that immediate contact be made with the Office For Emergency Management at Washington. Major General Wells concurred in this view. The Co-ordinator explained that this had already been done; and Mayor Petrie pointed out that the Governor and Dr. Fronk were now on their way to Washington to present the territorial situation to the Chairman of the Emergency Office. It was agreed that no direct action could be taken by this group that would in anyway interfere with the Governor's program.

Mayor Petrie announced that just prior to his departure for the mainland, Governor Poindexter had appointed the following Territorial Advisory Defense Council:

Honorable Lester Petrie, Chairman
 Dr. H. L. Arnold
 Honorable William Ellis
 Col. Perry M. Smoot
 Honorable A. S. Spencer
 Honorable S. M. Spencer
 General Briant H. Wells

The Mayor read to the Council a letter from Admiral Block, in which he stated his willingness to cooperate with the Major Disaster Council; and he greeted the representatives of the Army and Navy who were present, thanking them for the wonderful cooperation they had given and were giving.

Mayor Petrie then stressed the necessity for the various committee chairmen keeping the Co-ordinator informed on all activities within their committees, furnishing him with copies of all pertinent correspondence, and also with a list of the personnel of the committees, together with office and home addresses and telephone numbers.

It was suggested and agreed that all publicity should be released through the office of the Co-ordinator.

After some discussion it was agreed that afternoon meetings were most convenient for the majority of the members, and the first meeting of the Executive Committee was called for 2 P. M. on Thursday, May 26th, 1941, in the office of the Mayor.


Mayor Petrie announced that all members of the Major Disaster Council must sign the Oath of Loyalty, and stated that notaries would be present in the Assembly Hall at the close of the meeting to administer the oath.

The meeting adjourned at 2:30 P. M. to meet again at the call of the Chair.

[92]

KEY TO ORGANIZATION CHART
MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY
OF HONOLULU

1. Co-ordination & Intelligence-----	T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation-----	Addison E Kirk
3. Communications-----	Alvah A. Scott
4. Power and Light-----	Leslie A. Hicks
5. Personnel-----	D. Ransom Sherretz
6. Law and Order-----	W. A. Gabrielson
6A. Provisional Police-----	Major Douglas C. King (Ret.)
7. Law Enforcement-----	W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection-----	W. W. Blaisdell
8A. Fire Wardens-----	Paul Carter, Director
9. Water and Water Supply-----	Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways-----	Jos. F. Kunesh
11. Medical-----	Thos. M. Mossman, M. D.
12. Health and Sanitation-----	F. M. Haralson, M. D.
13. Red Cross-----	John F. Gray
13A. Housing & Shelter-Evacuation-----	
13B. Necessities of Life-----	Frank E. Midkiff
13C. Rehabilitation-----	Lyman H. Bigelow
14. Rescue, Demolition, Gas Prot-----	W. A. Gabrielson
15. Air Raid Warning-----	Federated Churches
16. Religious Worship-----	A. K. Powlison
17. Recreation-----	Duke Kahanamoku
18. Mortuary Work-----	Jon Wiig
19. Law-----	George Waterhouse
20. Finance and Supplies-----	Oren E. Long
21. Education-----	Stafford L. Austin
22. Rural-----	W. W. Beers
23. Food Production-----	
A. Zone 1—District 5-----	Sam Damon
B. Zone 2—District 4-----	Cleghorn Robertson
C. Zone 3—District 4-----	Tom Waddoups
D. Waterfront Warden-----	J. L. Friel
Not Shown: Sub-committees reporting direct to Co-ordinator's Committee:	
Engineering-----	H. A. R. Austin
Publicity-----	Walter Macfarlane
Camouflage-----	Robt. O. Thompson
Protection of Art-----	Edgar C. Schenck



[94]

EXHIBIT "C"

SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, FROM DECEMBER 7TH TO 31ST, 1941, INCLUSIVE

The Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu notified the Mayor promptly upon receipt by him of word that the Island of Oahu was being bombed, by enemy Japanese planes. He then proceeded immediately to his headquarters at the City Hall.

All Committee Chairmen and members of the Council were notified by telephone and radio to report immediately to the City Hall for duty. Within an amazingly short time all Chairmen and sub-chairmen of the twenty-six committees under the Major Disaster Council, had reported, and organizations composed of committee members and volunteers proceeded according to previously laid plans.

Mayor Petrie, who is also Chairman of the Major Disaster Council, authorized the Co-ordinator to use the facilities of the City Hall for headquarters, as he saw fit, thus making it possible to concentrate the majority of the work near the office of the Co-ordinator.

The Co-ordinator was then appointed Director of Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu by the Territorial Director.

A clerical staff, composed of City and County employees, court workers, and volunteers from private industry, and others, was organized to handle the dissemination of information and instructions from the Co-ordinator to his Chairmen. This staff worked steadily all day Sunday and through the night. On Monday an arrangement was made to divide the staff into three groups, each working an eight hour period, viz: 8 A. M. to 4 P. M.; 4 P. M. to 12 midnight; and 12 midnight to 8 A. M. A competent person was appointed to direct the work of each group. These volunteers continued in full force for the first week—there being several hundred of them—after which the government employees returned to their departments, where they were needed as many department heads are also chairmen of Major Disaster Council committees. From that time on a strictly volunteer staff has carried on. In the past week it has been possible to cut this group down to approximately thirty-five persons during the day, and a smaller number of volunteers at night, but a crew has been maintained on twenty-four hour duty in the Co-ordinator's office since the commencement of the war on December 7th, 1941.

In accordance with arrangements which had been made during the preparatory period, the American Legion delegated twelve men for use by the Co-ordinator in his office. These Legionnaires served as assistants to the Co-ordinator, and as guards and aides, performing any service asked of them willingly and efficiently. Two of these Legionnaires were appointed as Shift Directors in the office of the Co-ordinator. One other Shift Director and three Liaison Officers were also appointed by the Co-ordinator to assist him in the handling of the tremendous volume of work which centered in his office during the first three days following the attack. With these Shift Directors and Liaison Officers there were stenographers, typists and clerks on duty day and night.

[95] Attached to this resume are copies of the reports of activity by the various individual committees during the period from December 7th to December 31st, 1941. These reports speak for themselves, and I can add nothing but the highest praise of the manner in which directions and instructions forwarded from the Co-ordinator's office to the Committee Chairmen, were followed out by the Chairmen and their workers.

As martial law was declared immediately after the disaster, and all civilians ordered off the streets, it was necessary that some means of identification for civilian defense workers be devised.

The Military Governor ruled that only Major Disaster Council identification cards would be recognized, and for several days this office issued identification cards, each bearing a number; arm bands (white with a large, red "CD" printed on them); and red, white and blue "CD" stickers for automobiles to all persons presenting proof that they were engaged in civilian defense operations. A record was kept of all cards, bands and stickers issued.

The number and type of volunteers was amazing, and most gratifying. They ranged from Army and Navy wives, resident civilians etc., to mainland salesmen whose work was interrupted and tourists who were stranded in Hawaii and anxious to do their bit. All came forward and offered their services, then served faithfully in whatever task was assigned them. One City and County official

stepped into a job of manual labor in order to get help quickly to people in distress. Many volunteers gave up any possibility of income to serve in civilian defense as long as they were needed; others found themselves without employment for one reason or another, when they returned to their businesses at the end of the first few strenuous days. Many of these latter have continued to work long hours without remuneration and without complaint.

During the first two or three days practically all questions regarding all phases of the problems facing the City and County of Honolulu came to this office. Clerks were on duty twenty-four hours a day to answer these calls and aid persons in need of information and assistance. Queries ranging from an inquiry from a Navy wife asking if her husband had been killed at Pearl Harbor, and service men attempting to locate their evacuated families, to simple questions of whether or not we were still being bombed, passed over the desks of these clerks, were disposed of, and a record kept of them. In the first two nights of the Blackout hundreds of calls were received. Some reported suspicious lights and signalling which warranted the investigation they received; others proved to be very bright stars twinkling in our blue Hawaiian sky. One woman threatened to go through the Governor to the President of the United States if guards were not placed on a downtown hotel, which was at the moment heavily guarded. Others reported incidents which were passed on to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

To sum up the activities of the Co-ordinator's office, for the first three days all placing of evacuees, taking over of schools for first aid stations, directing and instructing fire wardens, securing guards for buildings, utilities, etc., were directed and supervised by the Co-ordinator, and the work was carried out by the Committees of the Major Disaster Council as the Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

[96] For the last two weeks the office has continued to function, carrying out the instructions and orders of the Military Governor, and Civilian Governor and the Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, and generally carrying on civilian defense operations. For the third week of the War there has been maintained in the City Hall a skeleton crew on twenty-four hour duty—all committees having returned to their own headquarters. There is, however, a large staff on call which can be rounded up and ready to work within an hour from the receipt of any announcement of an alert.

/s/ T. G. S. W.
T. G. S. WALKER,

Director, Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

JANUARY 2nd, 1942.

[97] HAWAII CHAPTER, AMERICAN RED CROSS—ITS PART IN THE CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Alfred L. Castle, Honolulu, Hawaii.

[98] The Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross, was set up in World War I on a Territory wide basis. It maintained a certain amount of service on Oahu after the war, and a skeleton organization throughout the Territory. There was no difficulty therefore for the Chapter to swing into any preparedness program for World War II.

PRELIMINARY

In June of 1940 the Hawaii Chapter decided that it should prepare itself and likewise take active part in the production and shipment of needed articles to our probable Allies, particularly Britain. At the Executive Committee meeting of June 13, 1940 a Production Committee was set up with Mrs. H. V. Von Holt, Chairman; Mrs. S. R. Damon, vice-chairman; and Mrs. Arthur Molyneux, chairman of Production. Mrs. H. S. Turner, was chairman of Surgical Dressings; Mrs. David Akana, chairman of Supplies, Instruction and Supervision; Mrs. Heaton L. Wrenn, chairman of Knitting; and Mrs. Peter K. McLean, chairman of Volunteer Special Services funds. After this same meeting contact was made with supply houses in Honolulu to the end that raw materials and supplies would always be on hand. It was pointed out that Hawaii might be the object of attack. Groups on Oahu, Molokai, Kauai, and at three localities on Hawaii were already at work on surgical dressings. From then on, for a period of 9-10 months, the majority of dressings and garments of various sorts produced

were sent to the British Red Cross. Contact was, however, maintained with the Army here, for at the meeting on November 28, 1940 Mrs. von Holt reported that the Army had recommended that one quota of surgical dressings be kept here for local use, a quota being approximately 17,000 dressings. At that meeting, however, it was felt that about 50,000 dressings should be kept here, which was done for those early stages.

EXPANDED WORK

By March of 1941 the Chapter had materially increased its work, and was more definitely pointing to the need for local preparedness. It was reported that from our local production 145,000 surgical dressings, and over 6000 knitted garments had been made and shipped to the British Red Cross, but from then on policy changed and production was held here. At the meeting of March 21, 1941 the pending M-day bill in the Hawaiian legislature was discussed. The First-Aid Committee reported some 1000 women had completed courses. Mrs. Moir reported that two Motor Corps classes had been completed, one at Schofield Barracks totalling 30 women and one in Honolulu with 28. Further steps were taken at that meeting to set up again the formal Branch organizations on the outside islands.

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

In April of 1941 the Supervisors of Honolulu created a Major Disaster Council to coordinate the resources of the City, with residents, firms, agencies and organizations to meet any major disaster or emergency. The Red Cross, acting under National charter, could not surrender in any way either its direct prerogatives or obligations, but the Hawaii Chapter immediately cooperated with such Council and throughout did its agreed-upon part. Because of their long experience, Mr. John Gray, for nearly 20 years with the Red Cross in Hawaii and executive secretary of the Chapter, and Alfred L. Castle, [99] Chapter vice-chairman, were at once assigned to the preparedness work, both acting as members of the Major Disaster Council and liaison between the Army and Red Cross. Mr. Castle had organized the Hawaii Chapter in World War I, was the first Field Director here, was a deputy commissioner and executive secretary for the Red Cross in Siberia, and special representative to Japan, China, and the Philippines in World War I. The relations between the Hawaii Chapter and the Major Disaster Council were of the best throughout.

WAR PREPAREDNESS

The plans of the Red Cross were laid primarily with a view to air attack by Japan, an attack which might be directed not only against military and naval objects but also against the city, whether deliberate or not. The possibility of bombardment was considered, and, to a small degree, invasion and its effect on the civilian population. Besides repeated conferences with the Major Disaster Council (hereafter called the Disaster Council), conferences were had by Messrs. Gray and Castle, individually or together, with the Commanding General Walter G. Short, and the Department Surgeon, Col. Edgar King and members of his staff. As a result of the conferences with the Army, General Short on May 10, 1941 wrote Mr. Castle a letter which stated in part:

"* * * In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

- "1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.
- "2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

"It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available.

"* * * It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem."

General Short's letter is attached hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A". Relationships between the Army and Red Cross throughout the entire period to December 7 were of the best.

Under this general title of War Preparedness the work will be grouped under appropriate subheadings.

(a) *First Aid Training and Aid Stations.*

By the end of March 1941 and as a part of the intensive Red Cross program nearly 1,000 persons had received first aid training.

In April of 1941 the Preparedness Committee of the [100] Honolulu County Medical Society, headed by Dr. Harry L. Arnold with Dr. Robert B. Faus as executive officer undertook, in cooperation with the Red Cross, a very intensive first aid training program. Red Cross instruction books were used, and Red Cross certificates awarded for those who passed. Strictly Red Cross classes were also continued separately. While the larger part of this operation was conducted by the Preparedness Committee, and the history will appear in the reports of Dr. Harry L. Arnold, Chairman of that Committee, the net result was that many thousand persons were trained and qualified prior to December 7.

On April 25, 1941 a joint statement on the training plan was issued by the Preparedness Committee and the Red Cross and published in the Honolulu Press. Such statement is hereto attached and marked Exhibit "B".

In September of 1941 the National Red Cross in Washington sent to Hawaii two expert instructors in first aid and water safety to assist in the intensified program.

As a part of the general program it was essential that aid station equipment be obtained so that on an attack there would not only be available trained personnel but aid stations fully equipped, with trained personnel, so that casualties could be effectively handled. It was contemplated that much of the funds necessary would come from the M-Day bill being considered by the Territorial Legislature in April. The bill apparently was lost the last night of the session in the first days of May, and no relief was forthcoming. The Red Cross then at once stepped in and supplied emergency funds, until after June 30 the Board of Supervisors of the City was able to make further appropriations. Had not the Red Cross stepped in at that time the entire program might have been seriously jeopardized. (See letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold, dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C", enclosing copy of the letter of General Short (Exhibit "A"), and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto, marked Exhibit "D".)

It was likewise necessary to obtain the actual equipment for first aid stations, which are referred to in the correspondence attached variously as "units," "medical units," "aid stations" and "emergency units," and physically to set these up for operation at carefully selected sites. The Army, in the first instance, came to the rescue, agreeing to loan 20 units to the Red Cross. In early June, sixteen units had been received from the Army, which were immediately put to use. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Gray to Mr. Castle, dated June 10, 1941, marked Exhibit E.)

Meanwhile, to hasten matters and to get further aid from the National Red Cross in Washington, John Gray, executive secretary of the Hawaii Chapter, left here on April 15 for Washington armed with letters from Colonel King, the department surgeon, specifying medical supplies and emergency units necessary for use for the civilian population in case of an attack, and not purchasable locally. The medical supplies will be referred to later. Later in May and June Mr. Castle was in Washington also discussing both subjects with National Red Cross headquarters. Tentative agreements were reached and by the end of July twelve complete medical station units, costing some \$25,000, were ordered for shipment to the Hawaii Chapter. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Mitchell to Mr. Castle, dated July 22, 1941, marked Exhibit F.)

These units all arrived in Hawaii prior to December 7, and were held in accord with a letter from Colonel King, [101] dated July 29, 1941, marked Exhibit "G."

On the Japanese attack, Honolulu had adequately trained personnel and properly equipped first aid stations at 20 separated points, sufficient to meet any emergency existing on that day and for the entire war as it developed. Each station had been adequately supplied far in advance by the Hawaii Chapter, Red Cross, with surgical dressings and other production equipment.

The matter of expansion of hospital facilities referred to in General Short's letter was handled by the Preparedness Committee.

(b) *Medical Supplies.*

The Department Surgeon, Colonel King, felt that emergency supplies of drugs and medicines, not procurable locally, should be on hand for civilian use, with

which we agreed. This list, prepared by Colonel King, was taken on April 15 to the National Red Cross by Mr. Gray and under date of May 16, 1941, the Red Cross here was advised that National would send such supplies. In June the City decided to make certain purchases of medical supplies, but Mr. Castle then in Washington was able to explain that such purchases did not conflict or in any way overlap the articles desired of the Red Cross. The medical supplies requested of the Red Cross were delivered in Honolulu beginning in August, in various batches, up to December 4, 1941, at a cost of about \$40,000.

(c) *Production Department—Surgical Dressings.*

Beginning in April 1941, all production was held in Hawaii, and the character of the production was molded to meet an anticipated attack. The number of workers, all volunteers, who came to the work rooms at the Castle Kindergarten and elsewhere steadily increased. Work done was on surgical dressings, hospital garments, operating robes, convalescent robes, pajamas, knitted goods and other necessary articles. In July the Department Surgeon was given a statement, marked Exhibit "H," showing the disposition of locally produced Red Cross surgical dressings in the Territory, in addition to actually finished goods held in Honolulu. The statement also showed that material had been ordered for approximately 240,000 more surgical dressings.

In August a quota of surgical dressings, about 17,000 dressings, was divided among the 20 aid stations operated by the Preparedness Committee (Drs. Arnold and Faus). Certain hospital garments and other emergency robes or garments were likewise distributed.

Long before December 7 the Red Cross used certain homes, with proper basements, and two school buildings, at widely separated parts of the City, for the storage of such articles that would be used at once in case of an attack. There were more of such storage centers, away from headquarters at Castle Kindergarten, and in them were stored surgical dressings, hospital garments and robes, convalescent robes, and such, women's and children's clothing, and canned goods. All centers were selected with a view to both geographical distribution and quick accessibility.

In October and November the Hawaii Chapter in its surgical dressings production centered on special Army dressings, and between November 25 and December 4 delivered to the Army Medical Department here a total of 58,121 dressings.

[102] On December 7 the parties assigned to headquarters and to the storage centers reported on a prearranged schedule. From one center over 19,600 dressings were released for the Pearl Harbor hospital, together with certain garments, and one quota, about 17,000, was sent to Tripler Hospital from another center, deliveries in each instance being made by the Red Cross Motor Corps.

The foundation laid and the experience gained during the entire year of 1941 made possible the enormous and specialized production for the services, Army, Navy and Marine, which steadily increased throughout the War, in the latter months averaging well over 1,000,000 surgical dressings per month.

(d) *Motor Corps.*

Motor Corps was organized in April and May of 1941, its first work being the collection, sorting and distribution of books and magazines to our armed forces. In order to qualify, members had to take prescribed courses. Regular duty was started on July 21, 1941, with 28 Army wives, 17 Navy and 49 civilian women, married or single. Due to the evacuation policy of service personnel, by December 7 there were only three in Motor Corps directly connected with the Army or Navy, their places being largely filled by local women. In order that the Army and Navy should be fully acquainted with Motor Corps uniform, cars, and insignia, as well as for humanitarian reasons, Motor Corps from July on took convalescents from Military and Naval hospitals for drives and excursions. During the fall months additional training was given in first aid, emergency delivery of babies, military drill, gas and chemical warfare lectures and demonstration, and blackout driving. A complete list of assignments, subject of course for change, was made for attack day, so on December 7 certain Corps members reported at once to assigned posts, and the balance at headquarters.

On December 7, and for the immediate days thereafter, not a single preparation proved to be futile. Motor Corps carried supplies to Hickam, Pearl Harbor, Schofield and other posts, assisted evacuees, and hurried back and forth from all Army and Navy posts on innumerable assignments. Naturally, such posts were

closed to the public on the attack, but the fact that Motor Corps and the Red Cross uniform had been previously well known made it possible to go right through to complete vital assignments, whereas others were turned back. All this was not an accident—it had been carefully thought out and prepared for months in advance; and on that particular day, a Sunday, proved a Godsend.

(e) *Evacuation and Disaster Relief.*

It had been agreed in advance that evacuation, housing and feeding of civilians caused by an enemy attack was primarily a governmental function. Nevertheless, the Red Cross stood by to assist and cooperate. On December 7 Motor Corps assisted in transporting evacuees. The Red Cross took charge, and assumed responsibility for the large group of evacuees housed at the University of Hawaii. Movements of evacuees were quickly coordinated without the slightest friction between the Disaster Council and the Red Cross.

In accordance with prearranged plans the heads of the large supply houses in Honolulu, together with adequate staff and all available trucks and drivers, reported at once on December 7 for duty. Telephone orders from the Red Cross for clothing, mattresses, blankets, canned goods and innumerable items were promptly filled and delivered by the Red Cross [103] Motor Corps or properly authorized civilian trucks, as the case might be. The Red Cross did not have to go through any red tape but orders were taken over the phone and the charges made later. December 7 and the following few days cost the Red Cross some \$50,000.

(f) *Canteen Service.*

This corps was organized in August 1941. It had training in serving convalescents from Navy hospitals on picnics, and certain Allied contingents passing through Honolulu, both in conjunction with Motor Corps. The Navy had loaned the original equipment.

At 10 a. m. on December 7 the Canteen Corps was called to duty and set up service at once in the Iolani Palace grounds, feeding medical unit workers, officials, truck drivers, guards, emergency police, civilians, or any one who needed food in such grounds. Canteen Corps remained on 24-hour duty until December 17 when gradually its work in the Palace was taken over by the O. C. D. Service to evacuees, located and living in other parts of Honolulu was, as stated above, handled by the Relief Council and the Red Cross. By the time O. C. D. took over, the evacuee problem had largely worked itself out.

It is interesting to note that the acting chairman of this unit passed the entrance at Pearl Harbor that morning at 6:30 on an Inter-Island steamer on her return to Honolulu, receiving her call for service at her home shortly thereafter.

(g) *Home Service Department.*

This department, trained to assist service men and their families, was organized in September 1941 but not specifically as a war measure. On December 7, because of its trained personnel, it was at once of value in assisting evacuees to look up separated members of families, render temporary assistance and advice, to assist in new living arrangements, and to answer inquiries from the mainland.

CONCLUSION

The fact that civilian affairs ran so well on December 7 is definitely due to the intensive preparation of the Disaster Council, with all its ramifications, and the Red Cross. There was no panic or any semblance of one. It is remarkable that throughout all the training period there was no friction, but only a "pull-together" and "get-ready" spirit. The closest cooperation prevailed between the Disaster Council, its able director, T. G. S. Walker, Drs. Arnold and Faus, the Army medical department acting under authority of the Commanding General, and the Red Cross. On December 7 the Disaster Council's headquarters were at the City Hall, and the Red Cross at the Castle Kindergarten, both in the same block. The preparedness work as a whole stimulated the Red Cross workers in that period, and certainly assisted as a starting point for the amazing record of the Hawaii Chapter, all of which, except for "military secrets", appears in the printed Chapter reports issued subsequently for each year.

Alfred L. Castle.
ALFRED L. CASTLE.

[104]

EXHIBIT "A"

(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.)
Refer: (MED) 080

Mr. A. L. CASTLE,
Acting Director, American Red Cross, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. CASTLE: It has been brought to my attention that the local chapter of the American Red Cross has offered to take such action as may be needed, to continue the program of preparation for emergency relief for the civilian population, to become effective in event of disaster particularly such as might eventuate from an enemy air attack on the city. It is understood that the leadership thus assumed will be available until superseded by an appropriate Government agency or until for other reasons it is no longer needed.

That leadership, under those conditions as offered by the American Red Cross, is a source of the greatest satisfaction to me. May I again bring to your attention what seem to be the most urgent local needs. In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.

2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available.

Closely linked with the items in the first priority but not of such extreme urgency in point of time are:

1. The expansion of hospital facilities for the civilian population.

2. The provision of an adequate number of vehicles for ambulance service on call.

It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem.

[105] I consider your proposed action to be both adequate and timely and should like to see it be put into effect in the shortest practicable time in order to meet any disaster or emergency situation.

Yours very truly,

(S) Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[106]

EXHIBIT "B"

JOINT STATEMENT OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE AND THE RED CROSS

While the United States is not actually at war, and there is no occasion for war hysteria, the international situation is so critical that the civilian population of Honolulu must realize that the time has come *now*—not tomorrow for intelligent, adequate, civilian defense preparedness. No sane person can think otherwise. The Army and Navy is not here to protect the population of Honolulu; their duty is to defend Hawaii as one of the most vital parts of the American Defense system. In case of emergency the civilian population must be prepared to care for itself.

As one of the first and most constructive steps in this program the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association has undertaken the task of recruiting, training and getting ready for instant mobilization a large group of civilians who will be so organized that they can quickly render first aid, collect, sort, and transport to hospitals injured civilians with proficiency.

At least 50 doctors are now freely giving their time for this training period.

This program needs men and women who can become thoroughly trained in this work. As a part of the enlistment in this training and work, those taking the course are required to respond to their posts of duty at any call in an emer-

gency. Honolulu must be able to mobilize quickly and efficiently, and its volunteers must be competent to perform tasks assigned.

No program can be carried through without cost. The instruction books and supplies involved cost in excess of \$1.00, but the booklet received is a valuable one for anyone to own. The majority of people taking the course will undoubtedly gladly pay this \$1.00, but certain firms and individuals have contributed enough so that if anyone cannot afford this sum the booklet and supplies will be furnished them free.

At the end of the course examinations will be given in cooperation with the Red Cross, and those passing will receive proper certificates. To qualify for such certificate, the person must have attended instruction classes for at least 20 hours, must pass a written examination and certain demonstration tests in artificial respiration, digital pressure, etc., and practical problems.

The Red Cross, for a long time here in Honolulu and throughout the Territory, has been making up surgical dressings and materials of all types which would be imperatively needed in case of an emergency. The call on the Red Cross is and has been heavy, and will be for some time to come—how long no one knows.

The instruction courses being given by the Preparedness Committee do not overlap or conflict with the First Aid classes of the Red Cross. These latter classes are educational—vitality so now—and will continue as formerly, with the granting of the certificates to those who pass successfully. In less than a year now, 897 persons have successfully passed [107] the work prescribed in the Red Cross courses, providing a most valuable nucleus for any defense work.

(Honolulu, Hawaii, April 25, 1941)

ROBERT B. FAUS,
*Executive Officer in Charge of Plans and Training
for Preparedness Committee.*

ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross.

[108]

EXHIBIT "C"

MAY 13, 1941.

DR. HARRY L. ARNOLD,
*Chairman, Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu Medical Association,
Honolulu, T. H.*

DEAR DR. ARNOLD: Confirming our conversation of recent date, I wish to define the relationship of the Red Cross with your committee in connection with the point of first aid training, the equipment of first aid stations, etc., as originally worked out by your committee.

The program originally proposed by your committee was a very vital part of the plans already prepared for M-Day. It had been assumed that the legislature would pass the M-Day bill, which in turn carried with it an appropriation of \$50,000 for what I may term the "training period," and a further \$250,000 after an emergency should be declared. This bill failed under circumstances not necessary here to relate, and left the entire program somewhat in chaos. Unless something was done for civilian defense, the attitude of Hawaii towards such defense seemed a disgrace.

The work of your committee, and the training in first aid for emergency purpose, were already under way. It seemed criminal to drop this for lack of funds. Accordingly, a tentative arrangement was worked out by which your executive officer, Dr. R. B. Faus, became Chairman of the Disaster Relief Committee of the Red Cross. You are also a member and you are familiar with the personnel of that committee, which consists of six. If you want to suggest another doctor or someone else on the committee please let me know, but, as pointed out below, the work will in practice function through your own committee.

The program so splendidly outlined and started by your committee is not technically a Red Cross function. Your own program is more properly a Government function which would have been carried out through funds provided by the M-Day bill. The Red Cross would in the usual situation function as a relief organization after a disaster has occurred. However, the Red Cross cooperates with other agencies, and in this particular instance it is obvious that work started by you must not stop; it is vital to defense, and is the first step in preparing against a disaster which might be much worse except for adequate preparedness.

It will not be the policy of the Red Cross to endeavor in any way to direct or control your work. For that reason we appointed Dr. Faus chairman of our committee, as the work he is heading up seems the most vital to be carried on. However, we will have to supply the funds, budget the same, and have the same properly audited; the same would be true whether you worked with Government funds or Red Cross. There are other matters in connection with disaster relief which we ourselves will have to work out and which were contemplated by the M-Day setup.

If and when Government funds are available the work of your committee will undoubtedly come under the Gov- [109] ernment setup, where it should properly come. There is no thought on the part of the Red Cross to retain any function properly belonging to another group, or in any way to take any credit for the work of the Medical Association. We are only trying to carry on as a stopgap until an M-Day program with Government funds can be perfected for I am convinced this must come sooner or later.

The big problem now is of course finance. I am informed that the minimum requirement of your present program is \$20,000, with more to come if the work is expanded to complete the setup. The Red Cross has not that amount available. It will therefore be our problem to consider ways and means of raising funds and of carrying on the work being done by you, until such time as Governmental funds are available. Please understand that the amount of assistance we can give is limited by the financial problem. I believe the present arrangement, as soon as this is approved by your committee, can be covered by temporary budget allotment.

I feel, also, that the present arrangement is a happy one, as the work of the Production Department of the Red Cross, and its own First Aid classes, very closely dovetails in with your work.

I enclose a copy of a letter from General Short which sets forth this entire matter far better than I can. He is very definite in his statement that this work should continue, and certainly the Red Cross will endeavor to cooperate to the best of its ability. Let me repeat again our assurance that we are not trying to dictate policies to you, or interfere with or control your work, but are merely trying to make possible the continuation of this work until our assistance is superseded by the appropriate Government agency.

Very truly yours,

/S/ ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter
of the American Red Cross.

ALC:GB
ENCL.

[110]

EXHIBIT "D"

HONOLULU, HAWAII, May 13, 1941.

Mr. ALFRED L. CASTLE,

Vice-Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. CASTLE: We are deeply appreciative of your letter of even date, offering the financial assistance of the American Red Cross in making preparations for disaster relief of the civilian population of Honolulu.

It is the unanimous opinion of this committee that we should accept your offer and proceed as rapidly as possible to secure the necessary funds and supplies as outlined in General Short's letter. The amount mentioned in your letter (\$20,000) would not be adequate for the full program, but would provide for the initial training period.

Yours very truly,

HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY,
By (s) H. L. ARNOID, Chairman.

[111]

EXHIBIT "E"

Excerpt—letter from John F. Gray, Secretary Hawaii Chapter, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, dated June 10, 1941.

"Under date of June 7th I wired you to let you know something of what had been happening here. I am now enclosing a clipping from the Advertiser June 5, 1941, outlining in more detail the action taken by City-County officials with regard to providing medical supplies and fire equipment. Bids have been let for the supplies and apparently these will be available in the near future.

In the meantime Mr. Evans, Special Representative from National Headquarters whom you did not meet, has contacted the military and civilian authorities during a brief stay of four or five days and he is to return on June 16th for a ten days' or two weeks stay at which time civilian activities will be coordinated with official agencies. Until then it was deemed advisable that the training of the medical units continue without interruption and the Army agreed to loan us up to twenty units, authority for this having been received from the War Department in Washington.

To date I have signed for sixteen of these units which have been delivered to the Armory in the custody of Dr. Faus and Mr. Fitkin who are assigning units to their various commanders. Mr. Evans also thought it advisable and wired for Washington to ship us twelve complete units for our own use here. Undoubtedly we shall have to set up at least one unit on each of the larger outside islands if for no other than psychological reasons.

Just this morning Mr. Davis of Consolidated Amusement authorized me to give publicity to the donation of the ambulance and that will be released within a day or two.

Production work is progressing very nicely under the leadership of Mrs. Molyneux. Mrs. von Holt was ill going up to the coast, as you may know, and she stayed in Los Angeles only a week before returning. She is not on duty yet but hopes to be very soon."

[112]

EXHIBIT "F"

Excerpt—letter from L. M. Mitchell, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, American Red Cross, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, Vice Chairman, Hawaii Chapter, dated July 22, 1941.

"Meantime, we are proceeding with the matter of medical supplies and have authorized the purchase of equipment for the twelve stations in accordance with the request transmitted by the Chapter and the letters prepared by the Army authorities. As soon as medical station equipment can be purchased, it will be shipped to your Chapter for assembly in the twelve station units, since it is not feasible at this end to break up the purchases and assemble the units prior to shipping. It is understood that these medical station units will be held for the emergency and that in the event an emergency need does not develop and there is later need for them elsewhere, they will be available for such use. With this understanding, the cost of this equipment is being met by the National organization.

"As indicated in our cable of yesterday to Mr. Gray, we have already ordered the revolving stock of medical supplies requested some time ago as a reserve to be held in Honolulu for immediate use in case of emergency. These supplies have actually been purchased for China and are shipped to Honolulu to protect your ability to meet any emergency that may arise. They should be held intact so that, if necessary, they may be forwarded to China at a later date, or shipped elsewhere as the need arises. It may be advisable with some items to forward the stock on hand in Honolulu to China and replace with fresh supplies in the interest of keeping the stock currently fresh: From time to time, the situation will be reviewed and appropriate action to keep the stock in current condition for immediate use will be made."

[113]

EXHIBIT "G"

(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.)

29 JULY 1941.

Mr. JOHN F. GRAY, *Field Director,*
American Red Cross,
426 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. GRAY: The following plan for the storage and issue of certain amounts of American Red Cross medical supplies, designated as "Reserve" and "Aid Station Equipment (12)", has been approved:

1. Both the Reserve and the Aid Station Equipment will be held in storage for actual use and not issued for training purposes. If items for training purposes cannot be secured from any other source, minimal quantities as approved by this office to be issued for this purpose.

2. All items to be stored under the control of the Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Medical Depot, properly dispersed, Storage to be at the risk of the American Red Cross.

3. Method of Storage:

a. Reserve Supplies. According to usually accepted rules.

b. Aid Station Equipment. Each to be earmarked for a particular local civilian Aid Station group. To be so marked and the proper civilian officials notified.

4. Issue. By order of the Department Surgeon, subject to approval of the Department Commander.

Please notify Captain Paul Nixon, Hawaiian Medical Depot, Fort Shafter, as far in advance of arrival of supplies as your information permits. Include approximate cubic footage space required and list of items.

Reference transportation, request delivery by you at points to be specified by Captain Nixon.

Yours very truly,

EDGAR KING,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Department Surgeon.

Information Copy:

Mr. A. L. CASTLE,
312 Castle & Cooke, Ltd.
Honolulu, T. H.

[114]

EXHIBIT "H"

SURGICAL DRESSINGS

HAWAII (1 quota) #—Hilo has material and is making a quota to be stored in Hilo: Mrs. R. M. Lindsay, Hilo, Phone 2006.

KOHALA (1 quota)—Has completed quota, five boxes, stored. Mrs. James M. Beck, Mahukona, Phone, Kohala 368.

KEALAKEKUA (2 boxes)—2 boxes shipped from Oahu. Assorted. To be stored by Mrs. William J. Paris, Kainaliu, Hawaii, Phone, 2 W 716.

LANAI (1 quota)—Ship from Oahu 5 boxes completed by Oahu. To be stored by Mrs. H. B. Caldwell, Lanai City, Lanai, No phone, must wire.

MOLOKAI (1 quota)—Material for 1 quota is being made up on Molokai and will be stored by Mrs. George P. Cooke, Kaunakakai, Molokai, Phone, 7 W 29.

MAUI (2 quotas)—Has material to make one quota Will ship from Oahu quota now being completed by Kahuku. To be stored by Mrs. Stanley Elmore, Spreckelsville, Maui, Phone, 4 W 576.

KAUAI (1 quota)—Has material and is making quota to be stored by Mrs. J. C. Plews, Lihue, Kauai, Phone, Lihue 326.

OAHU (3 quotas)—Will make and store 3 quotas here in three separate places. Material on hand for 3 quotas plus. Material for 14 extra quotas ordered from the mainland.

One quota contains approximately 17,000 dressings.

[115] MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII
PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

H. L. ARNOLD, M. D., *Honolulu, Hawaii*

[116] MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS

The first organized effort of the medical profession of Honolulu to prepare for the medical aspects of war, began in June of 1940. Dr. Clarence Fronk was appointed by the officers of the Territorial Medical Association to represent them on the National Committee on Medical Preparedness. During the following year, Doctors Fronk, Faus, Wallis, Keay and Burden were appointed as a Territorial Committee on Preparedness. The County Medical Society also appointed a Committee in 1940, consisting of Doctors Fronk, Palma, Fred Lam and James Kuninobu. This Committee met, made plans, and endeavored to interest the profession, but in general, their efforts did not meet with much success. However, on April 11, 1941, following discussions with the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, Colonel—now Brigadier General—Edgar King, the Honolulu County Medical Society elected a committee, consisting of seven members, Doctors Larsen, Judd, Strode, Pinkerton, Withington, Faus and the writer. These men were called the Preparedness Committee, and were given power to act for the Society in making the necessary arrangements to prepare for the care of civilian casualties in the event of war.

Organization

The first meeting of this committee was held on April 15, 1941. The conviction of every member of the committee that war was imminent and that it was urgently necessary for preparations to be made to care for a potentially large number of injured civilians is reflected in the following excerpts from the minutes of this initial meeting.

* * * * The following specific actions were taken :

Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

* * * * *
The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

* * * * *
Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business districts would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and [117] plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups."

The minutes of this first meeting of the Preparedness Committee are attached hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A".

Dr. Robert Faus (now Colonel, M. C. A. U. S.) was made executive officer in charge of plans and training and functioned as such until after December 7, 1941. Subcommittees were formed and additional advisers called in from time to time. Liaison was established with the Army, the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the City and County government, the Major Disaster Council under Mr. Walker, the Nursing Association, and innumerable other less important organizations. The close liaison maintained with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross is reflected in the exchange of correspondence with that organization (See the following letters in the presentation of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross: Letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C" enclosing copy of letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short, and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto marked Exhibit "D").

Training

The physicians of the city were divided into groups and assigned to specific duties in the event of war. One group of surgeons, with their volunteer nurses, was assigned to go to military hospitals and assist military surgeons in caring for their casualties, since it was obvious that the medical staffs of these hospitals for normal times would not be able to deal with a sudden influx of casualties resulting from enemy action. Other groups were assigned to do the same thing for the local civilian hospitals. Still others were assigned to First Aid Stations to care for minor casualties, and to prepare for transportation to the hospital those casualties too badly injured to be taken there without prior treatment. Twenty First Aid Stations were set up throughout the City in schools and public buildings, and in some instances in private buildings through the generosity of the owners, and to each of these a staff was attached. It was obvious that it would be necessary to train large numbers of lay personnel in the primary care of casualties, and there were not enough teachers to do this. Therefore, a course was instituted for "teaching teachers." A large class of teachers was trained by Dr. Faus and given diplomas by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, and the work of training the workers themselves then began. In all nearly 3,000 individuals representing all nationalities were given courses and certificates of graduation in the principles of First Aid, Ambulance Training, etc.

All of these training activities included extensive publicity throughout the entire community. Records of the Preparedness Committee show that from the time of its inception to November 30, 1941, members of the committee had delivered a total of 18 public speeches while newspaper publicity had totalled 3,775 inches in the columns of the local newspapers.

Finances were a problem from the beginning. Obviously, it was necessary to have some sort of an office and to have at least a skeleton personnel to do typing, mimeographing, mailing and so forth. The funds for this purpose came very largely from the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, although the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the Committee [118] members themselves, and many other persons of all nationalities contributed liberally of their funds for the purpose. The Army detailed a medical officer to the sole duty of assisting in the work. The large mercantile firms of Honolulu, such as American Factors, T. H. Davies, and many others, were contacted for permission to make arrangements to convert their fleets of trucks into ambulances by the addition of frames to hold stretchers. Two hundred and fifty such trucks were thus fitted and the drivers trained before December 7, 1941.

Nursing Services

A survey of the nursing facilities of the Territory, under Miss Matthews, was instituted and carried out and the nurses available for emergency duty in every community were listed, with their telephone numbers and capabilities.

Hospitals

The hospitals of the City were studied critically, with a view to discovering how their capacities to care for patients could be increased, and how they could be evacuated of the less seriously ill to permit the entrance of large numbers of casualties, should the occasion arise.

Supplies and Equipment

The supplies and equipment of the Aid Stations were in part loaned by the Army, and in part purchased by funds donated by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, and the City and County of Honolulu. Each Aid Station had at least two doctors assigned to it, two dentists, at least three nurses, a group of nurses' aides, ambulance drivers, and many other types of specialized personnel. These volunteers attended regular weekly meetings from June, 1941, until long after the war had begun.

Ambulances

Three ambulances were donated—one by the Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Association, one by the Consolidated Amusement Company, and one by the Schuman Carriage Company. These vehicles were almost indispensable during the training period for transportation of supplies, equipment and personnel to the various stations. The ambulances which would be depended upon if war came, however, were the converted trucks volunteered by Honolulu business firms. Mass rallies were held on several occasions in the Armory, and in the auditorium of McKinley

High School for the purpose of stimulating interest and furthering the course of training.

On each of the "outside" islands, a chairman was selected by the local County Medical Society and put in charge of the work, as had been done in Honolulu. The preparations were, of necessity, less elaborate and extensive than were in Honolulu, but every island, including Lanai, had made, long before December 7th, definite and detailed plans for what they would do in the event of enemy action.

Evacuation

Evacuation sites were provided for the various hospitals, to serve for a place to put less seriously sick patients, to make room for more seriously injured and to increase their possible capacity. It was also assumed that it was likely that a hospital might well be destroyed by fire or bombing and that the entire organization might find it necessary to move to new quarters. These were selected and arrangements made for transportation to them. The Major Disaster Council's transportation division, under Mr. Kirk, was responsible for these arrangements. In spite of the serious objection of the Bureau of Narcotics of the International Revenue Department, arrangements were made with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross to have on hand a generous supply of morphine. This was stored in a safety deposit vault, pending the need for its distribution. Typhoid vaccine was arranged for, from the Territorial Board of Health, it being felt that in the event that the people in the community, or any considerable number of them, were evacuated to the mountains, typhoid fever would promptly become a problem.

Blood Bank

The blood plasma bank, which had been established some time before, continued under the management of Dr. Pinkerton, also a member of the Committee, and strenuous efforts were made by him to increase the supply of stored plasma to be ready for an emergency. Due to general lack of public understanding of the blood donation idea, however, the quantity, while large in comparison with most cities was, of course, far from adequate. The work of the Honolulu blood plasma bank is discussed more fully in a separate presentation by Dr. F. J. Pinkerton.

Did the Plan work?

On the morning of December 7th, the Headquarters diary of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service at Kaahumanu School shows that the chain telephone system which had been set up in preparation for such an event began to function at 8:20 A. M., when Mrs. Nash called her office staff to duty. At 8:35 A. M., the ambulance trucks from Davies and Company and American Factors, Ltd. were ordered to fit their frames and be ready for call. Other companies were alerted later by Mr. Paul Meyer, officer in charge of the ambulance pool.

At 9:00 A. M., Colonel King, then Department Surgeon, telephoned in a request for twenty-six doctors and twenty nurses to report to Tripler Hospital. These nurses and doctors were called immediately; fortunately, most of the doctors of the City were attending a postgraduate lecture on wound surgery at that hour. At 9:10 A. M., Colonel King requested that as many trucks as possible, fitted as ambulances report to Hickam Field to carry wounded from Hickam to Tripler Hospital. Twelve trucks left immediately and others left as rapidly as they drove in to report. By 9:20 A. M., forty-five trucks were on their way to Hickam Field. Most of the wounded from Hickam Field were transported by these ambulances, and most of the treatment of the wounded was done by civilian physicians, nurses and volunteer helpers.

The Aid Stations were all manned promptly and reported in from time to time as shown on the attached blotter. In all, 2,344 persons were treated for illness or injury on December 7, 1941, by these organizations. Distribution of these treatments and, to some extent, the nature of them, is listed on the enclosed sheet. Lunalilo Station was actually struck by a Japanese bomb, set on fire, and compelled to move to an adjacent building.

Distribution of cases treated at the Medical Unit is shown on the tabulation attached herewith as Exhibit "B."

[120] The recognition of the Army for the services rendered on December 7, 1941, is reflected in the following memorandum from the Office of the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, dated January 19, 1942:

"Memo to: Dr. H. L. Arnold, Office of Civilian Defense.

"From: Headquarters Hawaiian Department—January 19, 1942.

"Request that the following statement, which has the approval of the Department Commander, be published in the Honolulu County Medical Journal:

"The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, wishes to take this opportunity to thank the physicians and their assistants for the splendid aid and cooperation rendered on December 7 and the period following in the care of the wounded. All did a superior job."

"For the Department Surgeon.

"(Signed) SIDNEY POSNER,
"Captain, Medical Corps."

Miscellaneous Activities

The balance of the day's activities was devoted to innumerable details of rendering assistance to sick and injured persons, to hospitals and doctors and to moving supplies and equipment to places where they were needed.

The wisdom and adequacy of the plans and training schedule were, it is submitted, demonstrated by the relatively prompt and smooth functioning of the organization when war came. The devoted service of the volunteer trainees and trainers, who spent hours and hours of time in preparing for war can never be adequately praised.

Major General Norman Kirk, the Surgeon General of the United States Army, in addressing a large group of physicians from the Service and the civilian community on January 26, 1945, at Kamehameha Hospital said, "Before beginning my talk, I want to express the thanks of the Army to the civilian physicians of Honolulu for the magnificent job they did on December 7th, *when they were ready for it and we weren't.*"

H. L. ARNOLD.

[121]

EXHIBIT "A"

MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE OF THE HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY—APRIL 15, 1941

All members present, and by invitation Dr. Clarence Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman. It was decided that the President of the County Medical Society should *ex officio* be invited to all meetings of the Committee in future, and that these meetings would be held weekly on Tuesday at noon at the Pacific Club when there were matters to be discussed and that notification would be sent out in plenty of time in advance. A quorum will consist of four members and the reporting will be done by the Chairman of the Committee.

The division of the committee into the following categories was approved:

Dr. Robert Faus—Executive, in charge of all phases of the Committee's work.

Dr. N. P. Larsen—In charge of plans for hospital expansion and evacuation.

Dr. Joseph Strode—In charge of hospital teams for civilian casualty care.

Dr. J. R. Judd—In charge of hospital teams for military casualty care.

Dr. Paul Withington—In charge of the collection and primary care of casualties.

Dr. F. J. Pinkerton—In charge of liaison with Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, other branches of the County disaster organizations, and Supplies and Publicity.

Dr. H. L. Arnold—In charge of administration, hygiene and sanitation.

It was agreed and considered of vital importance that all medical personnel be under the control of this committee and assignments of such personnel be made only under its sanction.

The following specific actions were taken:

Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

Dr. Mossman stated that he was in the process of preparing a master list of the available medical supplies on Oahu and he is to continue this work.

[122] The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

When and if the Disaster Board of the City and County lays plans for the construction of evacuation camps or shelters, recommendations for the hygiene and sanitation of these camps will be offered. Dr. Enright and Dr. Haralson were to be approached regarding the desirability of publicity concerning the need for typhoid and smallpox vaccination on a voluntary basis as soon as this can be done.

Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business district would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups.

A committee consisting of Drs. Fronk, Judd and Strode will confer upon two matters: one, the appointment of hospital teams for the care of hospitalized patients in both military and civilian hospitals and also upon the standardization of the treatment for burns and the acquisition of necessary supplies for this work. It was suggested that the physicians of the city be circularized as to what good and serviceable instruments they have which would be available for the use of the general disaster committee in the event of serious need for such instruments.

The principle was laid down that doctors who are asked to teach in the evacuation units now being organized will not of necessity be expected to serve in these units in the actual emergency but all doctors who are asked to do this work of teaching are urged to cooperate to the fullest extent.

Captain Gay is caring for the coordination of medical services during potential disaster with the other functions of the general disaster committee.

It was decided that all actions taken by the Committee should be given publicity by posting them in the office of the Honolulu County Medical Society.

There being no other business, the meeting was adjourned.

/s/ H. L. ARNOLD,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee,
Honolulu County Medical Society.

HLA : H

EXHIBIT "B"

[123] Cases treated at the medical unit, December 7-31, 1941

	Aliioli (8-12 no record)	Farrington	Kaneohe	Kaliua	Kalihi-Kai	Kawanakoa	Kaahunanu	Kuhiy	Liholiho	Lunalilo	Manoa	Maunaloa	Palana	Pohukaina	Scottish Rite	Thos. Jefferson	Wahiawa	Waialae	Hqts. Unit	Waikiki		
Deaths.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Deliveries.....	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dental treatment.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11	
Dressings.....	39	67	72	2	19	19	15	0	3	29	13	0	27	50	4	19	9	1	99	33	520	
Doctors called.....	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
Home.....	116	157	70	49	67	37	82	42	15	119	13	10	48	285	50	58	40	12	967	52	2,289	
Hospitalized.....	4	13	2	1	5	4	4	0	0	2	0	1	6	5	1	0	1	0	4	2	55	
Medical treatments.....	46	50	5	13	15	11	43	30	1	20	0	2	27	188	16	2	7	0	666	16	1,158	
Minor injuries.....	11	37	33	46	24	6	34	41	10	68	13	2	11	15	34	15	12	9	165	27	613	
Miscellaneous.....	24	10	5	4	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	11	0	0	4	68	
Severe injuries.....	6	6	16	0	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	8	1	1	1	2	0	0	4	54	
War casualties.....	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	18	0	0	15	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	42	
Total.....	120	170	72	50	72	41	86	42	15	121	13	11	54	290	51	58	41	12	971	54	2,344	

Total number of patients treated in the 20 medical units: 2,344.

[124] PREPAREDNESS OF THE HONOLULU BLOOD PLASMA BANK PRIOR TO
DECEMBER 7, 1941

F. J. Pinkerton, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii

[125] During the year 1940 many informal discussions were had by the physicians in Honolulu concerning the merits of a Blood Bank and the importance of such in the event that war developed between the United States and Japan. Ways and means were discussed pro and con by a few of the more interested and far-thinking physicians. Finally, at the suggestion of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, a letter was written to the chairman of the committee putting the general thoughts of the various discussions in letter form and suggesting that the Public Health Committee might be interested in financing and operating such a Blood Bank.

Since such a project involved the voluntary donations of blood from a favorable group, the matter was discussed with representatives of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and their interest and support solicited with the thought in mind that the membership, composed of young men, would be the best group to call upon for voluntary blood donations.

In February, 1941, an outline of the proposed blood and plasma bank was presented to the Public Health Committee of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and a committee was appointed by the chairman to supervise and inaugurate and begin operations of the blood bank. This committee was composed of the following:

Chairman of Public Health Committee, Chamber of Commerce, as chairman.
A representative of the Health Committee from the Jr. Chamber of Commerce.

A Pathologist.

A representative of the Surgeon of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army.

The Territorial Commisisoner of Health.

The Medical Director of the Queen's Hospital.

The City and County Physician.

Principal provisions of the plan were:

1. A central bank was to be established in the City and County Emergency Hospital to draw blood and prepare plasma.

2. The Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross was asked to assume charge of publicizing the project and securing donors.

3. The supply of plasma and its production for the Blood Bank was to be under the direction and control of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu.

4. No blood or plasma was to be offered for sale.

5. As a beginning the central supply was to consist of 100 flasks of plasma, 250 cc. each.

6. Certain equipment was to be purchased for hospitals on Oahu desiring to prepare plasma in addition to that of the central bank. (In order to decentralize and to encourage widespread interest in the technical preparation of plasma and the operation of a blood bank it was decided to offer to all the hospitals minimum equipment which could be brought into [126] operation when an emergency arose and to train the technicians of those hospitals in the technic.

Budget: A budget of \$2,000, later increased to \$3,000 was appropriated by the Public Health Committee of the Senior Chamber to convert space at the City and County Emergency Hospital into a laboratory, and to purchase equipment and pay salaries. A physician, a medical technologist and a bacteriologist were employed to supervise the laboratory. Eight hospitals on Oahu, (six in Honolulu and two in rural Oahu) agreed to participate in the program. Equipment was purchased for all of them and their own technicians were trained in plasma technic by the Blood Bank technologist.

Opening of bank: After four months of preparation and securing equipment from the mainland, the first blood was drawn on June 2, 1941. A schedule of bleeding nine to twelve donors' a week was maintained. At the end of three months, 96 men and women had given blood and 77 flasks of plasma were on hand.

Additional appropriation: \$1,000 additional was appropriated by the Chamber of Commerce and a plan approved for doubling the goal to 200 flasks and to speed operations to care for about 30 donors a week. Under the new schedule, within five weeks 153 donors had given blood and the goal of 200 flasks had been passed.

Cost: The cost of the last 138 flasks came to \$7.25 per 250 cc., as compared to the cost of \$19.50 to \$27.50 per 250 cc., for commercial plasma.

Red Cross: In October of 1941 the Blood Bank project was offered to the American Red Cross but this organization did not accept the offer because of lack of approval from Washington.

Closing of bank: In November of 1941 the Chamber of Commerce feeling that the demonstration had been successful and that enough experience had been had to insure protection to the community in the event of war, closed its doors. Several weeks were required to draw and culture the plasma then in the process of production and to take inventory of the equipment.

Storage: On December 1, 1941, 203 flasks of plasma were placed in the cold storage warehouse at the Hawaiian Electric Company and plans were made to turn the central laboratory over to the City and County Hospital for an indefinite period (to carry on the functions of a central blood bank for emergency needs if required).

Sneak attack on December 7, 1941: On December 7, 1941, our Army and Navy bases were attacked and an urgent appeal by Service hospitals went out for plasma. The chairman of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce delivered 75 flasks to the Tripler General Hospital, 80 flasks to the Queen's Hospital for civilian use and 45 flasks to the Pearl Harbor Naval Hospital. Within six hours the total supply, the product of months of effort, was exhausted. The doctors who attended the wounded that day tell of men who were carried in, very evidently marked for death, and they also tell how many of these men still live because of the life-giving plasma being on hand and ready for instant use to be poured back into their veins.

[127] *Immediate expansion of blood bank:* Now the value of those months of preparation, of standardizing technic, of training technicians, was felt. A call for donors was broadcast over local radio stations and the response was overwhelming. A schedule of 50 donors per hour, 10 hours a day, 7 days a week was maintained for two weeks. Every available doctor and nurse was enlisted to assist. Between 20 and 30 doctors worked on a volunteer basis from 3 to 5 hours daily in taking the donors, many of them in addition to their First Aid Station duties. Men and women from all walks of life and all economic levels stood in line for hours. War workers came after their long shift of duty, as did dock workers and workers in the sugar and pineapple fields. The original blood bank laboratory was placed on 24 hour duty, the personnel working in three eight-hour shifts, sterilizing equipment, preparing sodium citrate, culturing plasma and dispensing it.

The laboratory at the Queen's Hospital typed the donors, ran serological tests on the blood, prepared plasma and dispensed blood and plasma.

Units were instituted at the Experiment Stations of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association. Equipment and technical assistance were borrowed from the University of Hawaii.

The other seven hospitals absorbed part of the load of plasma preparation with equipment provided by the Public Health Committee in advance of the attack. Personnel of all these hospitals had been trained during 1941 for just such an emergency.

The Blood Bank was again offered to the American Red Cross but this offer was not accepted; it was then taken over by the Office of Civilian Defense who assumed responsibility for expenses incurred as of December 7, 1941.

F. J. Pinkerton

F. J. PINKERTON, M. D.

[128] PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES OF THE TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Addison E. Kirk, Honolulu, Hawaii

[129] THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING PEARL HARBOR

The following is a brief summary of the activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the records of this Committee have been forwarded to Washington, D. C., with the files of the local Office of Defense Transportation.

The Major Disaster Council was formed on June 24, 1941, with each member assigned as chairman of a committee. The Transportation Committee was formed immediately thereafter with members heading some committee, each of which dealt with a particular type of transportation with the exception of the Engineering Committee. Various meetings were held, including joint meetings, with the representatives of the Evacuation Committee and other committees affected by transportation.

In the beginning the Committee's activities consisted of a complete survey of all types of transportation including railroad, highway, ships, barges, tugs and airplanes. The Engineering Committee made a survey and an analysis of each garage, service station and repair shop on the island. The information secured was tabulated and cross indexed. Prior to December 7th, roughly 5,000 trucks, buses and vehicles of all types were listed. This listing included the individual responsible for the unit, key personnel in larger companies with telephone numbers and addresses for out of hour calls.

The list of vehicles ranged from heavy duty trucks to small pick-up trucks and included refrigerated units which might be used for the temporary storage of food at evacuation centers.

The Engineering Committee, in its survey of garages, had a complete list of the machines, tools and other equipment available for emergency repairs as well as major overhauls. Personnel of each garage was listed and special training noted. Compilation of the capacity of all gasoline storage was included, both for the purpose of refueling during an emergency and for the dispersion of this highly necessary fuel.

The "danger zone" which had been established by the military authorities was divided into four zones with a committee member in charge of each.

In classifying transportation vehicles, including buses, the listing was divided with those available in the city of Honolulu in one and those in the country districts in the other. As stated before, by December 7th, there were approximately 5,000 of these vehicles listed. These did not include certain trucks which had been turned over to the Medical Committee for use as ambulances. Prior to December 7th these vehicles had been outfitted as ambulances with removable equipment which could be installed in a very few minutes.

With the attack on December 7th, all committee members reported to their posts and calls for transportation equipment began to come in shortly after the attack.

I am pleased to report that the cooperation of those people volunteering their equipment was 100%. The volunteer drivers exceeded the requirements. I am happy to report that all requests for transportation received after [130] 9 a. m. December 7, 1941, were filled satisfactorily and in each instance, the vehicles were dispatched not later than twenty minutes after the call came in.

The largest single job done that day was the evacuation of the women and children from Schofield Barracks and from Hickam Field to various cafeteria equipped schools in Honolulu. The movement from these posts was done in total blackout without serious incident.

Respectfully submitted,

A. E. Kirk,

A. E. KIRK,

*Chairman, Transportation Committee,
Major Disaster Council.*

[131] ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVILIAN POLICE RESERVE IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1, 1941

Heaton L. Wrenn, Honolulu, Hawaii

[132] On July 28, 1941, with the approval and under the authority of the Honolulu Police Department and Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, the Honolulu Police Reserve was organized under the leadership of Major Douglas G. King a former officer in the British Army. The purpose of the Police Reserve was to provide a trained body of citizens who could assist and augment the regular Honolulu Police force in time of emergency. 144 men enrolled in the first group and these men were given a course in police training. This training consisted of 14 lectures by police instructors. The subjects included the apprehension of criminals, search and seizure, judo, the law of arrest, criminal law, criminal investigation, traffic work, identification work, first aid and other pertinent subjects. The lectures were held once a week on Monday evenings at the Central Intermediate School from 7:30 to 9:00 P. M. The final evening lecture was concluded on October 27, 1941. Thereafter the men were given training during the daytime in drilling, judo, riot guns and pistol shooting. 24 of those enrolled in the first class dropped out during the course of instruction. 120 of the first class were commissioned as officers of the Honolulu Police Department on November 3, 1941.

Beginning on September 9, 1941 the members of the class started accompanying regular police officers on their beats on every eighth day. On the graduation of the class it was decided that the group would meet once a month for further instructions. The first meeting of the group was held on December 1, 1941 at the Central Intermediate School.

A second class of 38 men was started on November 25, 1941. This course of instruction was interrupted by the events of December 7, 1941.

On December 7, 1941, 114 of the first class and 28 of the second class went on active police duty.

On December 7, 1941 the 142 members of the Police Reserve did regular police duty guarding important installations, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in picking up enemy aliens and persons suspected of being dangerous to the security of the community, guarding the office of the Japanese consulate, evacuation work in bombed areas, traffic duty, and in fact doing the same type of work as the regular police officers. Following December 7, 1941 the members of the Reserve for a time did duty every day and night for several weeks then the group was divided so that they did duty every other day. Subsequently the Reserves were divided into six groups, each of which did regular beat work during the third watch for one night a week and on two nights a week every seventh week.

The members of the first class who went on duty on December 7, 1941 represented the several racial groups comprising our population and were largely business men. For example, the group numbered among its members an undertaker, a physician and surgeon, an interior decorator, bank tellers, a dentist, trust company officials, salesmen, accountants, lawyers, an instructor in physical culture, steamship executives, newspaper executives, contractors, an industrial relations director, radio executives, chemists, clerks, architects, dairymen, investment brokers, bankers, merchants, hotel executives, insurance salesmen, securities salesmen, theater executives, a veterinarian, florists, bookkeepers, scientists, mechanical engineers and agriculturists.

[133] Following December 7, 1941 additional groups of Reserves were given intensive police training, commissioned as officers and did active police duty. The Reserves for a substantial portion of the time they were on active police duty numbered approximately 300 men at one time on active status.

The Honolulu Police Reserve was the first organization of its kind organized in the United States and probably the only group whose members went on regular duty as commissioned uniformed police officers performing all the functions of regular police.

The Police Reserve continued on an active status until October 13, 1945.

HEATON L. WRENN.
Heaton L. Wrenn